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 This thesis investigates the effect of complementary product variety (or 
variety effect) in a system market. A system consists of a platform (hardware) 
and its complementary products (software), and a system market is a special 
form of two-sided market where consumers’ preference for complementary 
product variety is one of the main reasons for the existence of indirect network 
effect between hardware purchase and software availability. However, the 
existing literature often uses the number of software titles that are available for 
the compatible hardware to represent the software variety. This approach 
abstracts away the differences between each type of software and, 
consequently, the conclusion on the effect of software variety is simply ―the 
more the merrier‖. In this thesis, we aim to provide a deeper understanding of 
the variety effect by recognizing that each type of complementary software is 
different from the others and by allowing the software to have type-specific 
effect on the hardware adoption process.  
This thesis consists of three essays. Essay I uses an extended 
Generalized Bass Model to incorporate the effect of software variety on 
consumer adoption of hardware, and explains the variety effect on hardware 
diffusion from the information spillover perspective. Essay II proposes a 
structural model to examine consumer choices of competing platforms when 
software variety is part of the attributes to be evaluated. In line with the two-
sided market theory, Essay III further extends the diffusion model developed 
in Essay I to a co-diffusion model that describes the two-way adoption 
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externalities (i.e., indirect network effect) between consumers and software 
developers in the process of adopting a new-generation hardware technology.  
 We estimate the proposed models using retail sales data from the 
5
th
generation video game market in the United Sates. Here we highlight some 
of the key findings.  
First, the indirect network effect measured by the total number of 
available software is a composite effect aggregated up from different software 
types. Even if we find the overall effect to be positive, its underlying effect of 
each individual type varies significantly. Second, the results of all three essays 
consistently suggest that the top three game genres (i.e., sports game, action 
game, and racing game) have strong positive effect on hardware unit sales. At 
the aggregate (market) level, this effect can be explained as reducing 
consumer uncertainty of the hardware technology and facilitating word-of-
mouth communication in the social interactions; at the disaggregate 
(individual consumer) level, our results show that this effect is derived from 
the strong preference by a group of consumers who care more about software 
variety compared to the hardware technology and thus are more likely to adopt 
late. We also find positive effect in other game genres, but the effect is not as 
strong as that of the top three genres and is not consistently present throughout 
all three studies. Third, we find diverse patterns of two-way adoption 
externalities between consumers and developers for different types of software. 
Some types of software prompt hardware unit sales through the internal or 
external communication channels, while some software types do not show any 
effect on hardware purchases. Conversely, we find the growth of consumer 
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installed base drives up the software supply of all types unanimously, but with 
different magnitudes.  
 In sum, complementary product variety is a fundamental element of 
the indirect network effect in system markets. Ignoring information on the 
type of complementary software is detrimental when consumers exhibit 
preferences for complementary product variety. It is an underdeveloped area 
with many interesting issues to be explored. We hope this thesis will spur 
further research on variety effect in system markets and related issues. 
 
Keywords: system market, network effect, variety effect, two-sided market, 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
 
Many consumer electronic devices serve as a platform, through which 
consumers can have access to various types of software applications or 
contents for their daily entertainment, communication and office productivity. 
For instance, a smart phone enables consumers to make phone calls, check 
emails, and enjoy a number of Internet services using the 3G mobile 
technologies; a video game console is hardwired with an operating system so 
that consumers can play various types of games. The classic example is a 
personal computer installed with an operating system, on top of which 
software applications are able to run and perform different tasks at the user’s 
request. Each of these devices together with its complementary software or 
content services (or both) forms a market of a System. Sometimes it is also 
called Two-Sided Market.  
 
1.1  Overview of System Market and Two-Sided Market 
 We use the term System Market to describe a specific type of market 
that exhibits three main characteristics: 
 First, a system market is a market for a hardware platform and 
complementary products (Binken and Stremersch 2009). From the consumers’ 
perspective, the voice and data services supported by 3G mobile technologies, 
or the games and software applications run on PCs and other electronic 
devices are all complementary products to the platforms, albeit not perfect 
complements (i.e., being consumed in fixed proportions). The platform and its 
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complementary products together form a system. Since it needs both parts for 
a system to function, consumers’ demand for the former is dependent on the 
supply of the latter and of course, whereas consumers’ demand for the latter is 
conditional on the possession of the former.   
 Second, consumers in system markets need to have a variety of 
different applications and content services. Variety in this thesis refers to 
different types of applications that provide distinct functions to the users, or 
different types of contents and services that induce distinct consumption 
experiences/feelings. Smart phones such as iPhone designed by Apple Inc. and 
the Android phones that Google developed for the mobile devices drive the 
latest trend in mobile industry. It makes the cell phone also a mobile Internet 
device, an organizer, a game console, a media player, a digital camera, etc. 
Video game market is another example. Video games are complementary 
products to the game consoles
1
, and the games are categorized to different 
genres based on the ways game players overcome the obstacles and win the 
challenges (Apperley 2006). Hence the game-playing experiences that players 
get from each genre can be very different. 
 Third, there are two-way adoption externalities between consumers 
and complementary product providers. The hardware platform is a durable, 
and it requires a continual supply of new complementary products to be a 
sustainable system throughout its life cycle. It is especially so when the 
platform is mainly for entertainment products such as movies, music, and 
games. On the other hand, the platform providers, as the sponsors of a new 
                                                 
1
 In the newer-generation, video game consoles can also act as a platform to get Internet 
access, or as a DVD player to play other contents other than games. Acknowledging that, our 
discussion is restricted to the games, mainly because our empirical study is on the variety of 
video games.  
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technology, may not have enough resource or capability to produce all the 
complements in-house. Even if they can, it may not be economically efficient 
to do so. Therefore in practice, we often observe many independent content 
providers or software development companies working with the platforms. 
This structure results in the two-way adoption externalities between the 
consumers and complementary product providers.  
The adoption externalities between the two different parties are also 
termed as indirect network effect. This theory has received great attention in 
academia and industrial practice since the seminal work by Katz and Shapiro 
(1985, 1994), and Church and Gandal (1992), among others. There is indirect 
network effect mainly because the value of a hardware platform to consumers 
is increasing as more compatible applications are to be provided in its 
expected lifetime. The externality exists due to the uncertainty on how many 
independent developers will come on board, and provide complementary 
products for the platform. After all, the adoption by independent developers 
indicates the quality and reliability of the platform from the developers’ 
perspective. Similarly, the willingness of software developers to work with a 
particular platform also depends on the expectation of the size of the potential 
customers who will adopt the same platform. Because only those consumers 
will be their potential customers who would purchase the compatible software 
they made. This interdependency creates the two-way indirect network effect 
between the two parties whose demand for the hardware platform is dependent 
on the demand generated from the other party in the market
2
. In fact many 
information technologies are subject to indirect network effect, and the 
                                                 
2
 The developers’ demand for the same platform is realized by working with the platform and 
providing compatible products. 
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hardware-software system is a typical example (Church and Gandal 1992, 
Shapiro and Varian 1999).  
 The last characteristic is the key factor distinguishing a system market 
from other traditional multi-product markets which do not exhibit two-way 
adoption externalities. For example, sugar is complementary to the 
consumption of tea. Although in this two-product market consumers' demand 
for tea is not independent from the market condition of sugar, the dependency 
is merely reflected in their cross-price elasticities. There is no adoption 
externality between consumers and sugar vendors, because consumers do not 
need to use the information on the supply of sugar to resolve the uncertainty 
on the quality of tea. Similarly, the sugar vendors do not need to rely on the 
tea providers to sell their products to consumers, since consumer demand for 
tea is too little a factor to have impact on the total demand for sugar at all. 
Therefore, there are no two-way adoption externalities and it is not a system 
market.  
To simplify the notion, we do not differentiate between the hardware 
(e.g., PC) and its operating system (e.g., Windows) and treat them as one. 
Implicitly we assume that the agents involved in a system market make their 
entry decisions sequentially: a hardware maker enters the market first with a 
proprietary or open platform; then the software developers and consumers 
enter the market and make hardware adoptions over the hardware life cycle. 
Since our focus is on the second stage, i.e., the inter-dependency between 
consumer demand for hardware and the supply of complementary software, 
treating the hardware and its operating system as one entity should not affect 
our investigation. Moreover, given that the hardware-software paradigm is a 
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classic example of system market, and many related studies are based on this 
paradigm, we use the terms hardware and platform, software and 
complementary products interchangeably.   
 The economic literature has introduced a more general theory Two-
Sided Market to characterize the two-way adoption externalities between two 
distinct groups of agents when they make platform adoptions, such as the 
consumers and software developers in system markets. This theory explains 
how the platform enables interactions between two groups of agents with 
distinct objectives and ―tries to get both sides on board by choosing proper 
pricing structures‖ (Rochet and Tirole 2006). In fact, system market is only 
one type of two-sided market. Two-Sided market has a more general structure, 
and can be applied to many other marketplaces. These include match-making 
market, credit card market, and shopping centres, etc. Figure 1 depicts the 
interactive relationships involved in a two-sided market.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 Compared to the amount of work accomplished on indirect network 
effect, researchers have paid far less attention to the issue of complementary 
product variety in system markets, although variety is one of the driving forces 
of the existence of indirect network effect in those markets (Church and 
Gandal 1992, Church et al. 2008). Each complementary good is simply treated 
as another variant. Consequently, the consumer preference for variety is 
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abstracted away, and in the end only the number of variants matters, i.e., the 
utility derived from a system is an increasing function of the number of 
software titles. This approach is accepted and well adopted by most empirical 
studies (e.g., Dranove and Gandal 2003, Nair et al. 2004, Dubé et al. 2010). In 
this approach, even when the researchers have identified the positive indirect 
network effect, they have very little to say on how the consumers value 
different types of complementary products as they make hardware adoptions, 
nor can they provide insights on how the hardware firms should coordinate the 
supply of complementary product variety more efficiently. The main reason is 
because it ignores the identities of different types of complementary products. 
We believe recognizing the differences between a variety of complementary 
products would provide a deeper understanding on how the indirect network 
effect works in the hardware adoption process, and is more relevant to the 
marketing researchers and practitioners. 
In a system market, consumers are generally variety seeking for the 
complementary products; accordingly, the hardware platform is often designed 
to provide multiple functions and services through different complementary 
products. Such characteristics bring the following questions: when a consumer 
decides on when to adopt a hardware platform and which hardware to choose, 
does he or she consider different types of complementary products to be 
equally important or certain type is more important than the others? Further, if 
there are multiple consumer segments with different preference structures for a 
system, then for each segment, what type or types of software will make the 
hardware more attractive? When multiple platforms exist in the market, do 
they need to differentiate from each other or compete head-to-head? More 
15 
 
importantly, as the consumer demand for hardware and the continual supply of 
software are interdependent, how to drive up the demand for the hardware 
platform on either side more effectively as consumers respond differently to 
different types of software, and vice versa? Those are the questions we attempt 
to address in this thesis.  
Market practitioners have started exploring the management of 
complementary product variety in system markets before the academia does. 
The rule of thumb is to have complementary products across different types to 
be ready for release as many as possible before the hardware launch. For 
instance, a game console maker would not launch its new console unless a 
dozen or so game titles in popular genres are also in place. Shopping center is 
another example. When preparing for the opening of a new shopping center, 
the first thing the general merchandising manager needs to secure is to have a 
few ―anchor‖ stores ready for the grand opening. Then more retail stores 
offering specialized products or services will follow when certain volume of 
consumer visits is ensured by the anchor stores, because they do not have 
enough power to draw consumer visit on their own. Focusing on certain types 
of complementary products in the early stage implies that the platforms 
believe different types of complementary products do not share the same 
capability of attracting customers. Thus, the management of complementary 
product variety is of strategic importance in system markets.  
The research development on variety management in system market 
has fallen behind. The only paper recognizing that software titles are not 
homogeneous is by Binken and Stremersch (2009). They showed that 
superstar software (i.e., best sellers) have significantly larger effect on 
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hardware unit sales than the average titles. We believe both the best sellers and 
software variety have major impact on hardware sales. Best sellers are mostly 
those game titles that have significantly higher quality than the average titles 
(as reflected by their enormous popularity); in this sense, Binken and 
Stremersch (2009) investigate the effect of software quality on hardware 
adoption. In contrast, the focus of this thesis is on the consumer preference for 
different types of software, which are used to fulfill different aspects of 
consumer needs, or provide different functions (e.g., in PC market). It is worth 
mentioning that in a way the variety effect is recognized in Binken and 
Stremersch (2009), because their model allows the marginal effect of superstar 
software to vary across different game genres, and the results showed that the 
superstars from certain game genres have higher influence than those from 
other genres. This finding provides us some empirical evidence that software 
variety does matter at least for the superstars, but we still do not know how 
those genres are different from each other, and why they have distinct 
influence to the hardware adoption process.   
In this thesis, we are interested in the differences between each type of 
software in its effect on consumer adoption of hardware. We call it the effect 
of complementary product variety or simply the software variety effect. We 
aim to investigate this effect from both the aggregate-market and individual-
level modeling approach, and examine the characteristics of adoption 
externalities (i.e., indirect network effect) between the consumers and 
complementary product providers in a two-sided market framework. We use 
data from the video game market in the United States for model estimation. In 
video game industry, the console makers, game developers, and consumers 
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constitute a two-sided market where the game developers and consumers both 
need to make decisions on whether and when to adopt the hardware 
technology provided by the console makers. The supply of game titles that are 
compatible with a hardware console is an indicator of hardware adoption by 
the developers of those games; the console unit sales in each month represent 
the realized hardware adoption by consumers. We are interested in how 
consumers respond to the supply of each type of game software when they 
make hardware adoptions, and how their adoption behavior affects the supply 
of compatible games. We intend to pursue this topic in three essays, each with 
a different research angle and modeling approach.  
 Pioneered by Frank Bass (1969), the diffusion model provides a useful 
tool to describe the adoption process of a new technology and to evaluate the 
impact of marketing efforts in the process. Several studies in diffusion 
literature have looked into the indirect network effect on new technology 
adoption process (Bucklin and Sengupta 1993, Gupta, Jain and Sawhney 1999, 
Chun and Hahn 2008, and Niculescu and Whang 2009). But there is no 
agreement on how this effect should be incorporated in to the diffusion model, 
nor have any of them examined the possibility of different impact introduced 
by different software types in the hardware adoption process.  
In Essay I, we propose a diffusion model for consumer adoption of 
hardware in the presence of indirect network effect. We also provide 
explanations for the effect of software variety from the market communication 
and information spillover perspective. In general, the increase in software 
supply makes the compatible hardware more valuable to consumers. Besides 
the benefits from the increased variety, continual software supply also reveals 
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information on to what extent the developers believe the hardware technology 
would be a success. This information spillover encourages hardware adoptions 
by consumers, because the potential risk of choosing the wrong technology 
becomes less. Reducing the uncertainty about the quality and future success of 
the new product (hardware) is the key reason for WOM effect. This provides 
the theoretical justification of the approach we use to incorporate the network 
effect into a diffusion model framework.  
Drawing on the current knowledge of communication channels in the 
diffusion of innovations (Rogers 1983, Mahajan, Muller, and Bass 1990) and 
their relation to the Bass diffusion parameters, we are going to examine 
through which communication channel each type of software influences the 
hardware adoption. More specifically, we address the following questions: 
- Do consumers value different types of software equally informative 
when they adopt a hardware platform? 
- Do the software titles of different types all show positive network 
effects? 
- How does the effect of software availability on hardware adoption 
change over time, and across software types? 
 In order to investigate the variety effect, we first need to have a method 
to measure software variety. Consumers not only care about the total number 
of complementary software, but also about how different they are from each 
other. If variety plays a role, the marginal contribution of one more title to the 
platform adoption would not be the same across software types. Since people 
tend to categorize objects to different groups based on the level of 
similarities/dissimilarities between the objects, we use the same logic and 
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measure variety at two levels: the first is the number of different types of 
software or the breadth of variety, and the second is through the number of 
variants within each type or the depth of variety.  
 While Essay I examines the platform adoption at the aggregate level, 
Essay II investigates the micro foundation of the diffusion process. Since 
consumers are the end users of both hardware and software, it is important to 
understand consumer preference structure and their choice-making process. To 
achieve this, we build a structural model for the hardware choices made by 
utility-maximizing consumers. A consumer needs to have both hardware and 
software as a system to function; hence adoption of hardware indicates a 
consumer’s willingness to adopt a system. Therefore, the utility at the time of 
hardware purchase is derived from the attributes of both hardware and 
complementary software, whereby the information on software variety would 
affect consumer purchase timing and brand choice.  
 In addition to cross validating the findings obtained in Essay I, a 
structural model also benefits our investigation in other aspects. First, it helps 
explain the software variety effect based on the utility theory and consumer 
preference structure, which is more in line with the network effect theory 
originated in the economic literature. Second, the discrete choice model 
framework allows us to study market competition between multiple platforms, 
which is not available with the proposed diffusion model for the whole 
product category. More importantly, we can conduct a series of policy 
experiments and draw insights on variety management in a competitive system 
market. Specifically, we intend to address the following issues in Essay II:  
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- How does the marginal contribution of each type of software to the 
hardware demand (i.e., the strength of indirect network effect) vary 
across software types and across different consumer segments?  
- In order to successfully launch a new hardware platform, should 
the platform focus on some particular type of software and provide 
as many applications as possible? Or should it have a broad 
coverage of software types but have less number of applications 
within each type?  
- In the competition between two consoles makers—Sony and 
Nintendo—in the 5th-generation video game market, what are the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of these two brands in terms of 
the marketing strategies and software variety management? What 
are the main reasons for Nintendo losing its leading position as the 
new-comer Sony entered the market?  
- What could Nintendo have done to hold its leading position and 
defeat Sony in the competition? On the other hand, is it possible 
that Sony could have won this competition more easily?   
In essay three, we aim to further look into the effect of complementary 
product variety from a two-sided market perspective, and model the growth of 
software supply as a function of the number of consumers who have adopted 
the hardware. The proposed model is an extension of the research on co-
diffusion process. According to Bucklin and Sengupta (1993), co-diffusion is 
to describe adoption of the same or compatible technology by two distinct 
groups of agents when there are two-way adoption externalities between them 
(e.g., the externalities between retailers and product manufacturers as they 
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decide on the adoption of Universal Product Code (UPC) technology). We will 
follow their definition from the perspective of adoption externalities between 
distinct groups of agents, and study the characteristics of the adoption 
externalities between the consumers and game developers in the video game 
market.  
In order to have a better understanding of their interactive relations, it 
is important to clarify who are the adopters in each diffusion process and 
whom they interact with, because the interaction involved in co-diffusion 
process is not limited to the adoption externalities. There are some studies on 
joint decision making by the same agent in the context of individual decision 
making, and the joint hazard is used to capture the interactions between 
multiple events. Clearly this thesis does not belong to this stream of research 
on concurrent diffusion (or adoption) of related products by the same group of 
consumers such as the diffusion of base and complementary products such as 
adoption of Kodak instant camera and the film (that also developed and 
marketed by Kodak) by the same set of consumers. The studies by Guevara, 
Elberse, and Putsis (2007), and Niculescu and Whang (2009) both fall into this 
stream. 
 To our knowledge, essay three is the first study empirically examining 
the variety effect in a two-sided market framework. Insights obtained from this 
study will provide a multi-faceted picture of the indirect network effect which 
is more than just ―the more the merrier‖. The platform will gain more leverage 
in the system market if it has knowledge on the characteristics of software 
developers and their demand for the hardware platform. Figure 2 depicts the 
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extended structure of two-sided market when the variety of complementary 
product is taken into account.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
 The characteristics of the co-diffusion process and their interaction 
relationships will provide important insights on software variety management, 
and help us understand: 
- What are the characteristics of adoption externalities between the 
pairs of consumers and each type of software developers? Do they 
all present two-way positive feedback loops? Are they symmetric 
or asymmetric? 
- What is the total size of software titles that could potentially be 
provided for each type, i.e., the maximum number of software 
applications to fully saturate the market for a given type of function 
or application? 
- How to improve the hardware adoption on both sides more 
effectively at different stages of the diffusion process?  
 
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we review the related 
literature on indirect network effect, two-sided market, and diffusion models. 
In Chapter 3, we give a general introduction on video game industry and the 
data prepared for model estimation. The details of three essays are given in 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 Our research draws upon and builds on three streams of literature: 1) 
indirect network effect and complementary product variety, 2) two-sided 
market, and 3) new product diffusion. We review each of them below.   
 
2.1  Indirect Network Effect and Complementary Product Variety 
 The literature defines two types of network effect (Katz and Shapiro 
1994): direct and indirect network effect. Direct network effect arises when a 
product becomes more valuable to consumers when more consumers buy the 
same product, in that they can communicate with each other more easily 
through the common platform or communication channel. Telephone, Fax 
machine, and many social networking sites like Facebook are typical examples 
that exhibit direct network effect. Indirect network effect arises, however, not 
because people prefer a product more with more users of the same product per 
se, but because they expect its complementary products and services would be 
available in more varieties and/or at lower prices as the number of users grows. 
Many industries are subject to indirect network effect: video games operating 
systems, 3G mobile services, and online shops like Amazon, etc. Both types of 
network effect introduce the adoption externality problem in most cases, 
because consumers’ adoption decisions are influenced by other agents’ action 
(The other agents do not include the provider of the focal product). In the case 
of direct network externality, there could be coordination problem among 
potential users in their adoption decisions. In the case of indirect network 
effect, the coordination problem is even larger. In addition to inter-consumer 
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coordination, there is a coordination issue among software producers as well 
as coordination across the two sets of agents, i.e., consumers and software 
producers. For this reason, the literature often uses the term network effect and 
externality interchangeably. Extant literature on network externality has 
shown that failure to internalize network externality in markets often leads to 
social inefficiency and welfare loss because the market adoption level is lower 
than the socially optimal level. On the other hand, strong network externality 
may lead to an inefficient technology becoming market standard when 
multiple standards compete with each other. Since the focus of this thesis is on 
indirect network effect, the remaining part is mainly on indirect network effect.  
 Church et al. (2008) argue that indirect network effect gives rise to 
adoption externality under certain conditions in software industry: 1) 
increasing returns to scale in the production of software, 2) free-entry in 
software, and 3) consumers have preference for software variety. Although it 
is recognized that consumer preference for software variety is one of the 
driving forces of indirect network effect in the hardware-software paradigm, 
theoretical models used in the literature are in very simple and stylized manner 
(e.g., Church et al. 1992, Nair et al. 2004, Dubé et al. 2010), which essentially 
are notions of adoption externalities. Although it gains from the reduced 
difficulty in solving market equilibrium and in model estimation, it ignores 
consumers’ underlying preference structure for product variety, therefore it is 
impossible to see the differentiating impact on the hardware adoption process 
by different types of software. So far almost all empirical studies on indirect 
network effects follow the same approach and measure the extent of network 
effect without differentiating the type-specific effect.  
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The only paper tapping on the variety effect is Binken and Stremersch 
(2009). They use time series analysis to investigate the effect of superstar 
software on improving the hardware sales, and find that different game genres 
have different levels of influence on hardware unit sales.  In this thesis, we are 
going to further look into the variety effect in system market, and its 
implications to the hardware adoption process at both macro and micro level 
modeling approach.  
 
2.2  Two-Sided Market 
 Two-Sided Market is a market where the platform enables interactions 
between two distinct groups of agents, and tries to ―get both sides on board‖ 
by choosing proper pricing structures (Rochet and Tirole 2006). As illustrated 
in Figure 1, there are typically three parties involved, i.e., a platform P , and 
two groups of agents A  and B who are located on either side of the platform. 
Platform P  creates its market value by facilitating the transactions between 
the two groups of agents, otherwise the cost of off-the-platform transaction 
might be too high to be materialized, or it would be inefficient. Depending on 
how good they believe the platform is able to boost the demand on the other 
side, say B , agents in group A  decide whether to join the platform or not, and 
vice-versa. This demand interdependency introduces two-way adoption 
externalities or indirect network effects between the two user groups. 
Normally we believe the adoption externalities in two-sided markets are 
positive. In certain circumstances they can also be negative. For instance, 
people tend to generate negative feelings towards advertisements, unless they 
are looking for information or they think it is entertaining. So consumers 
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might evaluate the media service (e.g., newspapers, magazines, or TV 
channels) unfavourably if there are too many advertisements on it.  
Depending on the nature of functions the platforms provide, two-sided 
markets can be characterized into three types (Evans et al. 2005). The first 
type is match making markets. In those markets the platform acts as an 
intermediary to help the agents with distinct needs find their perfect match, 
such as what eBay does for buyers and sellers. The second type is advertising 
supported media. In this case the indirect network effects advertisers impose 
on consumers are generally negative. The third type is the two-sided markets 
with complementary products or system markets, where the popularity of 
hardware platform depends on the variety of complementary applications. 
Essentially, the two-sided market theory provides a more generalized 
framework for us to understand the nature of indirect network effects. Many 
traditional markets such as real estate agencies, bars, or shopping malls, etc., 
can all be considered as two-sided markets. The key distinction from 
traditional one-sided market is whether it exhibits two-way adoption 
externalities (i.e., indirect network effects) or not. In one-sided market, there is 
no adoption externality between user groups. Wright ((2004) gives a very 
good illustration on this issue. 
As the theory of two-sided market develops, many empirical studies 
have also been conducted to test the existence and magnitude of adoption 
externalities in related markets. Gupta, Jain and Sawhney (1999) identify the 
two-way adoption externalities between consumers and complementor 
industries for digital TV technologies, using discrete choice model and 
simulation procedures. Nair et al. (2004) propose a static structural model to 
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describe the interdependency between hardware installed base and the degree 
of software provision in the PDA market. The software provision and 
hardware demand are derived from the market equilibrium. This approach is 
widely adopted by others. Clements and Ohashi (2005) focus on the issue of 
relative importance of hardware technology advancement and software 
provision in different stages of product life cycle. Liu (2010) derives consumer 
demand as a result of dynamic choice model, and examines the hardware 
pricing strategy in video game market, and Dubé et al. (2010) study the 
network effects and tipping in a dynamic structural model framework. Those 
studies all point out the endogeneity of complementary software supply due to 
the adoption externalities. Unfortunately they failed to address the variety 
issue involved in two-sided market (the importance of variety in system 
market has been demonstrated in Essay I). Neither did they demonstrate the 
connection between the demand for hardware platform and for complementary 
products.  We aim to investigate these issues using co-diffusion modeling 
approach.  
 
2.3  New Product Diffusion Process and Co-Diffusion Models 
 Since the seminal work by Bass (1969), describing and forecasting 
new product diffusion process has been an important area in marketing 
research. It is valued by both researchers and practitioners as a convenient tool 
to understand and forecast the market growth of new products with macro-
level data. The hazard rate in Bass model can be characterized by two 
parameters: parameter of external effect or the effect of impersonal 
communication, and parameter of internal effects or the internal effect of 
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―word-of mouth‖ social communication. Accordingly, consumers can be 
divided into two groups: the innovators who form their own valuation of the 
new product without influenced by other potential users and adopt the 
platform early, and the imitators who adopt the product in later periods 
because their adoption is mainly affected by others in the community. 
Therefore, the interpersonal communication or word-of-mouth (WOM) effect 
is an important factor that determines the speed and shape of diffusion process 
(Mahajan, Muller, and Bass 1990). Another merit of Bass model is that it 
allows us to estimate the total market potential M if we do not have prior 
knowledge about the size of target population that would adopt the innovation 
eventually. 
In diffusion literature, WOM is used to describe social influence or the 
contagious behavior in a social system, but it does not tell us what causes such 
social influence process. The literature in marketing and sociology (Van den 
Bulte and Lilien 2001, Peres, Muller, and Mahajan 2011) has provided several 
reasons that might introduce the WOM effect: information transfer (including 
social learning under risk aversion), normative pressure, and network effect, 
etc. Besides, one study also suggests that consumer heterogeneity in their 
propensity to adopt can be captured by the diffusion curve described by the 
Bass model (Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004). Note that those mechanism 
are distinct from each other, but their expression in data are the same, that is, 
the adoption rate would increase in the cumulative number of adopters in the 
market system. Unless we have other data source that enable us to separate 
those distinct factors, it is up to the wisdom of the researchers to decide which 
should be the major cause for the WOM effect. 
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Initially the adoption of an innovation is treated as an isolated process 
and the main focus is on investigating the effects of marketing mix variables 
on the new product diffusion process. Multi-Product diffusion is a relatively 
less developed area in diffusion literature. As our knowledge on multi-product 
relationship are broadened with the development of consumer research and 
economics theories, relatively little empirical support is provided to validate 
our understandings on complex marketing activities when multiple products 
are involved.  Bayus, Kim and Shocker (2000) did a comprehensive survey on 
this topic. It shows that studies by then were often limited to the competitive 
behaviors due to the substitution effects between successive technologies (e.g., 
Norton and Bass 1987, Mahajan and Muller 1996), whereas the interactive 
relationships among multiple products is potentially a broader issue. Product 
relationship can be substitutable or complementary to each other. The 
interactive effects can be symmetric or asymmetric, can be one-way or 
reciprocal. The field of marketing research calls for more studies on 
interactions between focal innovative technology and related products, so as to 
provide insights on marketing issues such as how to effectively achieve the 
optimal growth path of new technology by strategically participating in other 
related markets. 
More recent studies on multi-product diffusions include Guevara et al. 
(2007), and Niculescu and Whang (2009). Guevara et al. (2007) find positive 
interactions in the diffusion between PC and Internet adopters who belong to 
the same target population, and the existence of direct network effect that 
contributes to the expansion of consumer market size. Because both diffusion 
processes are originated from the same group of users, it is a study 
30 
 
investigating consumer adoption of complementary products. Another study 
by Niculescu and Whang (2009) is also on consumer adoption of 
complementary products. They look into the diffusion of voice and 
complementary data services in Japanese market, where the data service 
market is contingent on the installed base of voice service.  
One topic of particular interest to us is the diffusion research on 
indirect network effect in two-sided markets. Since the economic theory of 
indirect network effect was introduced, several studies have been conducted to 
identify the existence of indirect network effect between different parties with 
shared interest, and to examine its effect to their separate adoption processes. 
Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) found positive but asymmetric interaction 
relations between retailer demand for laser scanner and the demand for its 
complementary product—UPC bar codes by packaged product manufacturers. 
They show that estimation for the parameter of internal communication effect 
would be biased upward if the positive interaction were neglected in Bass 
diffusion model. They also define co-diffusion as the positive interactions 
between the two parties that adopt the same technology (or compatible 
technologies), which essentially are the two-way adoption externalities 
between retailers and manufacturers. In comparison,  the studies by Guevara et 
al. (2007), and Niculescu and Whang (2009) do not fall in the two-sided 
market framework, because in both studies the diffusion processes involved 
are about the same consumer group adopting two complementary products, 
instead of two groups of users adopting the same product (or platform). It is 




Previous studies suggest that the positive interactions in multiple 
diffusion processes can be driven by different reasons: indirect network effect 
or product complementarity, or multinational diffusions of the same product 
(Ganesh and Kumar 1996). It is important to have a clear understanding of the 
source and nature of the interactive relationship between multiple diffusion 
processes, so as to form the model parameterization correctly. In those studies, 
the interaction term of multiple diffusion processes is modeled as a time 
varying component of the external effect parameter to the adoption process. 
This seems to be inconsistent with the theory of network effect, in that it 
generates a positive feedback loop and consequently accelerates the adoption 
speed. It is noted that in Bass model framework, the parameter for external 
effect captures the proportion of innovators whose actions are not affected by 
intercommunications, but indirect network effect is a form of 
intercommunication between user two different groups. Furthermore, the 
increasing number of software is a signal of less uncertainty about the overall 
quality and market potential of the hardware technology. The reduced 
uncertainty on the new product would speed up the adoption process by 
introducing a positive feedback loop, which is captured by the parameter for 
internal effect in the original Bass model. Therefore, we will investigate the 
existence and nature of indirect network effect by modifying the parameter for 
internal effect in a Generalized Bass Model (GBM) framework.  
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Chapter 3: Video Game Industry Background and Data 
Description 
 
Today’s video game industry follows the business model originated by 
Nintendo in the 1980s (Evans et al. 2005). Nintendo issued licenses to 
qualified independent game publishers in order to broaden its game library, 
but at the same time introduced a security chip to lock out unlicensed games. 
It supposedly gives the console maker ability to better control the quality of 
their compatible games, and is the major difference between home video game 
and computer game market. Console makers, as a platform, usually price their 
consoles at or even below the marginal cost of production, at least when they 
try to build up the hardware installed base in the early stage of product life 
cycle (Liu 2007). At the same time, they capitalize on consumer demand for 
software variety and recoup profit from the sales of complementary games, 
produced both in-house and by independent developers. It is a highly 
competitive market for console makers. The major players in 1990s were Sony, 
Nintendo and Sega. Microsoft joined the video game market in November 
2001 with its first debut Xbox of the 6
th
 generation technology. During the 
same period, Sega quit the console market and specialized on game 
development. 
The sales revenue in the video game industry has been growing very 
fast over the last decade. The U.S. has long been the largest video game 
market, followed by Europe and Asia
3
. In 2001 Americans spent $9.4 billion 
on game hardware and software, which exceeded the box office revenue from 
                                                 
3





. In 2005 the annual revenue increased to $10 billion
5
 and 
reached $21.3 billion in 2008
6
, far outperformed the music industry. The 
number dropped a bit to $19.66 billion in 2009, due to the global economic 
recession
7
. The video game industry also exhibits strong evidence of cyclical 
movement in sales due to the technology advancement. The traditional 
wisdom of the console life cycle is around 5 years before the release of the 
newer generation consoles.  But this trend tends to change for the more recent-
generation consoles. Sony and Microsoft both claimed that their 6
th
 generation 
consoles PS2 (introduced in Oct 2000) and Xbox 360 (introduced in Nov 2001) 
will have a longer life cycle, probably ten years
8
.  
 We obtain the data from NPD Group, a market research company that 
keeps track on the video game hardware and software sales in the U.S. market. 
We use the monthly sales records of the 5
th
-generation consoles from May 
1995 to December 2004 since Sega introduced its new console Saturn. The 
generation of hardware technology is defined mainly by its CPU processing 
power. There are three major players in the 5
th
-generation video game market. 
Four months after Saturn was introduced, Sony’s first console PlayStation (PS) 
came to the market in September 1995, and one year later was Nintendo64 
(N64). We have information on monthly retail revenues and unit sales for each 
console and game. We also have information on the game title, compatible 
platform, introduction date and genre. Because in most video game settings 
players are asked to overcome certain obstacles, video game genres are mainly 
based on the similarities in terms of the ways obstacles are completed. NPD 
                                                 
4Recession? Don’t Tell the Video Game Industry, New York Times, May 24, 2002 
5
Top Video Games May Soon Cost More, MSNBC, June 17, 2006   
6
Entertainment Software Association 2008 Sales, Demographics and Usage Data. 
7
NPD press release, January 14, 2010. 
8Microsoft’s Vice President Denies New Xbox in 2009-2010,  Xbitlab.com, Feb 8, 2008 
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categorizes the game titles into 12 genres according to the industry routine. 
Table 1 and Table 2 provide the statistical descriptions of hardware and 
software of the 5
th
 generation. The top 3 genres that have the most revenues 
are sport games, action games, and racing games.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 & 2 Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 In the original NPD data on software game sales, the games are 
categorized into 12 main genres based on the nature of the game content. 12 is 
a large number for model estimation. Further, several genres share very 
similar growth path during the hardware life cycle. To keep the 
parameterization parsimonious, and focus on the distinction between different 
types of games, we first conduct cluster analysis to group similar genres into a 
―super category‖, and each super category is treated as a distinctive type of 
software games in later estimation procedure.  
 In the cluster analysis, the distance matrix between game genre pairs is 
based on the following variables: the mean value of number of copies sold per 
month, the mean value of number of game titles available per month, and the 
number of time periods (in month) since the first game title of each genre 
became available for each of three consoles considered in model estimation. 
The details can be found in Table 2 and Table 3.  
---------------------------------------------- 




 We form the distance matrix using Euclidian distance measurement, 
and then conduct the Ward’s minimum-variance cluster analysis. To check for 
robustness, we also use various subsets of the five variables, and each time the 
dendrogram suggests the same 3 clusters. Therefore, we are confident to claim 
that those variables chosen for the cluster analysis are all important indicators 
of the relative importance of each software type in the consumer preference 
structure. The game genres that more consumers like to play should have 
higher unit sales and more game titles. If the hardware and software firms 
have some knowledge of the consumers’ preference for software variety, more 
popular software types are more likely to be introduced earlier. Furthermore, 
the difference in introduction time also contains information on the consumer 
heterogeneity in their preference structure. Depending on what types of 
software and how many varieties are there available in the preferred software 
types, consumers who have different preferences may adopt the hardware in 
different stages. So if the game types that entered the software market at 
similar time periods are grouped in the same cluster, it is an indication of 
consumers who enter the market at similar periods would be more likely to 
favor those software types. Hence, the clusters of software types might tell us 
something about the clusters of consumers. 
As shown in Figure 3, cluster 1 includes all three hardcore game 
genres: sports, action and racing games. Cluster 2 consists of four genres that 
are less popular than the top 3 genres, but are still mainstream video games: 
fighting, shooter, family entertainment, and flight games. Shooter games 
became more popular since the emergence of a new subgenre first-person 
shooting games, with Doom being the landmark of this subgenre. Cluster 3 
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includes five genres that are least intensive and patronized by special-interest 
groups, including role playing, arcade, adventure, children’s entertainment, 
and strategy games. Some of them are rich in content.  For instance, role 
playing and adventure games require players to devote long period of time to 
it. But in general, those game genres are least intense, and the level of 
integration to the hardware technology required to highlight the feature and 
performance is least demanding among the three clusters.  
---------------------------------------------- 







Chapter 4: An Essay on the Role of Complementary 
Product Variety in New Product Diffusion Process 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In a system market consisting of the hardware platform and 
complementary software, consumers’ adoption decisions are heavily 
influenced by the direct and indirect network effect. The indirect network 
effect is more important when the variety of complementary products 
increases as more consumers adopting the same platform. Hence, an effective 
market penetration plan needs to have a solid understanding of the nature and 
characteristics of these two types of network effect in the hardware adoption 
process.  
We already know that direct network effect can be the underlying 
cause of WOM effect in the diffusion process, and the diffusion parameter q in 
Bass model is able to capture the strength of direct network effect (Van den 
Bulte and Lilien 2001, Pere et al. 2010).Things are not clear when indirect 
network effect also influences the diffusion process. When multiple parties are 
involved (just as the indirect network effect does), there is no agreement on 
how to incorporate it in diffusion models. Some of them put it as part of the 
diffusion parameter p, so it works in parallel with the WOM effect (Bucklin 
and Sengupta 1993). Some just chose to put it as a covariate in the diffusion 
model, as we often see in the generalized Bass model and proportional hazard 
model. For example, Chun and Hahn (2008) tried to model hardware diffusion 
in the presence of indirect network effect (or indirect network externality). The 
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effect is captured by the interaction between the hardware installed base and 
the rate of cumulative software supply between the current and previous 
period. They found that the indirect network effect influences hardware 
diffusion through the internal communication channels. But their model could 
not separate the direct from the indirect network effect, which makes it 
difficult for marketing researchers and practitioners to know which type of 
network effect is more important, and how they work with each other to push 
forward the platform adoption process in the marketplace.  
Our specification of indirect network effect in diffusion process is 
based on our understanding of the fundamental of WOM effect: to facilitate 
information transfer, especially when externality and uncertainty is the main 
theme in the diffusion process. The network effect often goes hand-in-hand 
with network externality, which is a source of uncertainty about the future 
success (or the quality) of the system. Hardware and software provide two 
sources of information that consumers can use to make inference and reduce 
the uncertainty. 
In this essay, we explain the direct and indirect network effects in the 
hardware diffusion process from the information spillover perspective. When a 
new-generation hardware technology is introduced into the market, consumers 
are uncertain about the performance of the new technology. They might doubt 
whether it is of good quality, whether it is going to have a significant market 
size, and how good the continual supply of complementary software would be 
in the future. Consumers tend to use the information of other people’s choices 
to reduce their own uncertainties. Zhang (2010) uses a learning model to 
describe how the kidney transplant recipients update their beliefs of the quality 
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of a particular kidney based on the adoption decisions of other patients. It is 
similar for the consumers in the video game market when they are uncertain 
about the new product; the only difference from the kidney patients is that 
they also use the decisions of the independent game developers to infer the 
―quality‖ of the hardware. It results in the direct network effect if the 
uncertainties are reduced when consumers see increasing adoption of the new 
technology represented by the hardware platform. The indirect network effect 
also exists if the uncertainties are reduced through information spillover from 
the complementary software. The supply of software provides useful 
information on the quality and potential of success of the new platform. 
Continual supply of new software does provide a signal that more software 
developers have confidence in the hardware quality and its market potential, 
and are more likely to provide new software in the future. This signal is 
reliable if the majority of software developers are from the third party, because 
they make independent decisions on whether to work with the hardware 
platform. Furthermore, due to the high fixed cost, the information on 
developers’ adoption decisions is likely to be more informative than that on 
consumers’.  
In the Bass model framework, the information of a new technology 
spreads through two distinct mechanisms. One is the external environment 
where consumers can access and process information without interacting with 
or being influenced by previous adopters. For example, consumers can infer 
the quality of a new product based on their knowledge of the firm’s prior 
success in related product markets (e.g., Apple Inc.); consumers can also learn 
about the new product attributes and quality via advertisements, company 
40 
 
website and articles, or direct sales forces including retailers and value-added 
retailers (VARs). In those cases, the communications are external and do not 
involve previous adopters. The other is WOM, i.e., the interpersonal 
communication with previous adopters. Certain information such as reliability, 
versatility, user-friendliness etc. will have better impact on a potential adopter 
if it comes from the previous adopters (e.g., personal blogs, chat pages, social 
websites, etc.). Consumers often spread and exchange information on the 
products with their relatives and friends who have usage experience. WOM 
effect can also be formed by just observing other users without literally talking 
to them. With more consumers adopting the same product, the confidence the 
potential customers have on the new product goes up and they are more likely 
to adopt the new technology. From this perspective, the WOM effect in a 
system market is equivalent to the direct network effect. Therefore, consumers 
can use either channel or both to reduce their uncertainties about the new 
product. In the Bass model the external effect is captured by the diffusion 
parameter p; the WOM variable is the cumulative sales up to the previous 
period, and the strength of the WOM effect is captured by the diffusion 
parameter q. 
In this study, we describe the direct and indirect network effect on the 
diffusion of hardware in a system market in line with the Bass model 
framework, and empirically test how different types of communication 
channels convey the indirect network effect in the diffusion process. Moreover, 
we are most interested in the following questions on the effect of software 
variety: Are the indirect network effects introduced by different types of 
software distinct from each other? If so, what are the implications to the 
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hardware adoption process? We believe software variety is likely to play an 
important role in the adoption decision, because as consumer demographics 
change over time, the preferred type or types of software at the market level 
should also change, given that consumers have different preference for various 
types of software applications. 
Extant studies have established the general conclusion that consumers 
prefer to have more software available in the market, but rarely do they 
investigate whether different types of software have the same effect on 
hardware adoption or not. The work by Binken and Stremersch (2009) is an 
exception. They found the super-star software applications (i.e., the popular 
software titles) have much higher influence on hardware sales than an average 
title in video game market. But they did not explore whether super-star 
software is more likely to come from certain types or genres, nor did they 
explain the communication mechanism through which the super-stars facilitate 
the strong network effect. As such, superstar effect is different from the 
variety effect that we are interested in, and this study provides a new angle to 
examine the discrepancies of indirect network effect different types of 
software have.  
 We use the national retail sales data from the 5
th
-generation video 
game market in the U.S. for model estimation. Although there are multiple 
brands of hardware introduced into the market sequentially and they are 
mutually incompatible with each other, we decide to look at the hardware 
diffusion at category level instead of brand level for the following reasons. 
First, the hardware technologies adopted by different hardware makers are 
categorized into the same generation by industry practitioners, because these 
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hardware consoles are highly comparable in performance and quality level, 
even though the CPU power of N64 is higher than its competitors.  The 
hardware technology is defined mainly on the basis of CPU speed and storage 
medium, which are the key components deciding the design capability of the 
game playing experience. Among the three main brands—Saturn, PS and N64, 
the first two are 32-bit system and N64 is 64-bit. Although Nintendo has 
advantage over its opponents in terms of the bit rating of console processor, it 
suffers from the decision to continue using ROM cartridge instead of CD-
ROM as game storage device. CDs have much larger storage space than 
cartridges and enable the developers to design more complex and richer game 
contents. Overall, the both sets of configurations of CPU and storage device 
have their pros and cons and are considered as imperfect substitutes from 
consumers’ perspective. Second, since they were introduced closely in time, 
and each console maker pre-announced its launch date long beforehand, the 
possible market expansion effect by the introduction of a new hardware should 
not be a concern in the model estimation. Third, we know that the diffusion 
model works well at the product category level if there is no major technology 
advancement in the observation period, despite the market competition among 
several products belonging to the same category. 
  In the next section, we describe how variety effect is incorporated in 
the diffusion model and the rationale of our model specification. In section 4.3, 
we explain the estimation procedure and report the results and findings. We 




4.2 Model Development 
 Following the GBM framework (Bass, Krishnan, and Jain 1994), the 
hazard of consumers adopting the hardware in discrete form is 
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where the dependent variable h
tS represents the hardware unit sales in period t. 
On the right hand side, 
1
h
tCS  is the value of cumulative unit sales by the end of 
period (t-1). The terms in the first and second parentheses constitute a typical 
Bass model, with three key parameters characterizing a market diffusion 
process: the parameter of external effect hp , internal effect hq , and total 
market potential hM . Next, the term ( )hx t captures the effect of marketing 
efforts such as pricing effect, as well as the seasonality effect during 
Thanksgiving (with dummy variable Nov ) and Christmas (with dummy 
variable Dec ). In line with the GBM structure, price takes effect in its 
percentage change.
h
tprice  is the average price of the hardware console at time 
t . The specification of covariates ( )hx t is  
1( ) 1
h h
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                  (4.2) 
Last, the random demand shock that is unobservable to econometricians is 
assumed to be an i.i.d random variable 2~ (0, )ht N  . Note that all the 
variables with superscript h are the events that happened in the adoption 
process of hardware console by consumers, and those parameters with 
superscript h are used to describe this adoption process.  
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As mentioned in the previous section, the diffusion parameter p  (i.e., 
hp in our model)
9
captures the effects of all external factors that affect the 
―appeal‖ of a product and increase consumer awareness. An example of such 
factors includes feature enhancements over successive upgrades that may 
increase the value of p over the technology life cycle. In a similar fashion, 
advertising by the sponsor(s) of new product/technology may also speed up 
adoption by increasing p either by (a) increasing the salience of the product 
features (persuasive advertising) or (b) increasing consumers’ awareness of 
the existence of the new product/technology (informative advertising). In a 
system market, an important driver of product benefit is the availability of 
compatible software so that as more compatible software become available, 
the value of p  may increase. Further, as the availability of software increase, 
it is likely to raise consumer awareness of the existence of the new hardware 
platform. Operationally it is quite easy to find information on the total number 
of software for a particular hardware; it is publicly available in many media 
sources such as consumer reports and industry magazines, etc., and there is no 
need to get it ratified from the previous adopters. Hence it is possible that the 
indirect network effect in a hardware diffusion model can be captured by the 
parameter p, and it is our first extension of the GBM to fit into the context of 
system market. We capture these external effects of software availability by 
letting the parameter p be a function of the cumulative number of software 
titles.  
                                                 
9
 It is meant for the parameter hp  in equation (4.1). Here we use p to facilitate the general 
discussion of the property of Bass model, by no means it is a new parameter not defined in 




To further investigate the effect of software variety and find out which 
type of software is more informative in the hardware adoption process, we 
allow the external influence of software to be type specific. Let there be G 
types of software. sg
tCN is the cumulative number of software of type g 
introduced at time t, and sgTN  is the total number of software developed for 
type g by the end of the observation period, which we treat as the end of the 
hardware life cycle. They are denoted with superscript sg to emphasize that 
those are the events happened in the adoption process of hardware console by 
software developers.  
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where parameter hpsg measures the strength of external influence of software 
type g. The normalized software supply /sg sgtCN TN reflects to what extent the 
supply of software variety type g has been fulfilled relative to the expected 













  is 
the overall effect of software supply on maintaining the awareness of the 
system. 
We know from the literature that the diffusion parameter q  captures 
the effect of all factors that affect the revelation and dissemination of the 
―quality‖ related information of a new technology. In a traditional market 
where the diffusion of a new technology is not conditional on the availability 
of its complementary product, WOM takes effect as the late adopters often 
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learn about the quality of a new technology through the experience of other 
users. It explains why WOM effect is measured by the product of the 
parameter q and the penetration rate represented by 1 /
h h
tCS M in our model. 
In comparison, the WOM effect in a system market could originate from both 
the users and software developers who have also adopted the hardware 
platform. After all, the hardware is merely a platform or medium for 
consumers to enjoy a variety of functions and contents provided by the 
complementary software. By observing how many software titles are available, 
consumers can better infer the quality of a hardware platform because it helps 
reduce the uncertainty they have on the hardware quality (Zhang 2010). 
Furthermore, we think it is more informative to help resolve the uncertainty 
when we look at how fast it is adopted by the independent developers as the 
hardware installed base grows, because it indicates the trajectory of software 
supply in the hardware life cycle. It implies that for this co-movement of 
software supply and consumer adoption of hardware to have a strong effect of 
reducing uncertainty of hardware quality, the development of the relevant 
software types and the functions they provide should be closely connected to 
the crucial application of the hardware technology. The marketing and 
economics literature (e.g., Church and Gandal 1992, Nair et al. 2004, Dubé et 
al. 2010) often assumes that each software title is produced by one 
independent software development company. Then the number of new 
software titles sgtN is a proxy of the number of developers who have just made 
hardware adoption (with some time lag). The proposed model further takes 
into account the indirect network effect through internal influence. It uses the 
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rate of software supply as the variable of social learning, and allows the effect 
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As shown in equation (4.4), sg
tN is the number of new titles introduced 
(or the number of developers who adopted the hardware technology) at time t 
of type g, and ( / )sg sgtN TN represents the (normalized) rate of software supply 
for type g. Parameter hqsg measures the strength of indirect network effect of 













  is the overall effect of software supply (or overall indirect 
network effect) through internal communications. Note that when we 
substitute equation (4.4) into equation (4.1), this internal effect of software can 
be considered as interaction with the traditional WOM communication with 
the previous adopters. After controlling for the indirect network effect through 
internal influence, the diffusion parameter 0
hq  measures the strength of direct 
network effect purely originated from previous adopters.  
The model specification of this study is more flexible than the other 
forms proposed in the extant literature. Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) only 
considered the effect of complementary product (i.e., the UPC barcode) on the 
diffusion of platform through the external influence. In the literature, most 
diffusion models of one product conditional on the other (e.g., the co-diffusion 
models) only consider the external influence. Chun and Hahn (2008) proposed 
a different approach. They suggested modeling the indirect network effect 
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through the internal influence without any theoretical justification.  It is 
possible for the indirect network effect to impact the hardware diffusion 
through multiple communication channels, and to influence consumer 
adoption process in different manners. The proposed model in this study is 
more general and flexible, which allows us to have a thorough analysis of 
these two communication channels, as well as the effect of software variety in 
system markets.  
The full model of direct network effect of hardware and the type-
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4.3 Estimation and Results 
 We use the three types of video games obtained in cluster analysis to 
represent the distinct types of software, and estimate equation (4.5) with the 
nonlinear 2-stage least square (N2SLS) method. The instrumental variables 
(IVs) used to control for the endogeneity of hardware price include 
information from both hardware and software side. On the hardware side, the 
producer price indices (PPI) of microprocessors, MOS memory devices, and 
storage devices are used to proxy the production cost of hardware consoles, 
because those are critical components of the video game consoles. We also 
include the lagged hardware price to incorporate other information that is not 
captured by the cost shifters. On the software side, the unit sales and unit sales 
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per title in each month are used. In the first stage of estimation, we ran the 
regression of hardware unit price on IV variables, and found high 
predictability. Further examination shows that the high predictability of IVs is 
mainly contributed by three PPI indices from the semiconductor industry. The 
1
st
-stage 2R reaches 0.94 if we regress on the three PPIs alone. Therefore, 
hardware price change is closely related to the change of manufacturing cost. 
The high 1
st
-stage   is also found in Chintagunta et al. (2005), Chintagunta et 
al. (2009), and Dubé et al. (2010). 
 There were three dominant console brands launched sequentially in the 
5
th
-generation era. In order to make sure that the parameter hM is a valid 
representation of the total market potential for the 5
th
-generation console, we 
allow the value of hM  to be responsive to the introduction of new brands, and 
check if it is sensitive to the incidence of new brand introduction. We tried 
three different forms: 
 1)
1 2 2 3 3
hM m m d m d   ;  
2)
1 2 2 3 3exp( )
hM m m d m d   ; and  
3)   0 2 2 3 3 2 31 exp 1 / (1 )
hM m m d m d m m         .  
where jd is the dummy variable indicating the entry of a new brand of system, 
0m is the total market potential for the 5
th
-generation market, and ( 0)jm j   is 
the market size before brand     is introduced. The results consistently show 
that hM  is not sensitive to the introduction of new brands, and only one out of 
three parameters in those specifications is significant.  So we report the 
estimation result with constant hM  . 
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 To fully understand the indirect network effect in the diffusion process, 
we estimate five variants of the full model (equation (4.5)). Model I is the 
original GBM without specifying indirect network effect of software, i.e., the 
software effect parameters hpsg  and 
h
qsg  are constrained to be zero so that the 
diffusion parameters hp and hq are both constant over time. Model II tests the 
overall indirect network effect through the external influence, but it does not 
recognize the software variety (i.e., the software type). This is when the type-
specific parameters hpsg  to be the same across types and parameters 
h
qsg all to 
be zeros for sg=1, 2,..., G. It resembles the conventional multi-market 
diffusion approach as well as the co-diffusion approach adopted by Bucklin 
and Sengupta (1993). Model III only examines the overall indirect network 
effect carried through the internal influence, by constraining type-specific 
parameters hqsg to be the same and parameters 
h
psg all to be zero. In spirit it is 
the approach adopted by Chun and Hahn (2008). The estimation results for 
these three models are in Table 4A.  
We further test the software variety effect (i.e., the type-specific 
indirect network effect) in three forms. Model IV assumes that the type-
specific indirect network effect only exists through the external influence; 
Model V assumes the effect exists only through the internal influence; and 
Model VI allow for the effect via both channels. The results for Model IV—
Model VI are in Table 4B. 
---------------------------------------------- 




The left panel of Table 4A is the estimation results for Model I—the 
GBM without considering indirect network effect. It shows that most 




dec are both significant, indicating strong market 
demand for the console during holiday seasons. The price parameter shows the 
right sign but insignificant. Next, the middle and right panels are the results 
for Model II and III in which the indirect network effect is recognized either in 
diffusion parameter hp or in hq . In Model II where the effect of software 
supply is included as part of parameter hp , the baseline of external influence 
0
hp becomes close to zero and insignificant, indicating that the software 
availability is the major source of information to maintain consumer 
awareness and purchase incentive. The estimate of the WOM effect in this 
model is also much less than in the simple GBM. We also find positive and 
significant indirect network effect through the internal influence in Model III. 
Overall, the results in Table 4A suggest that the modeling approaches by 
Bucklin and Sengupta (1993) and Chun and Hahn (2008) both are able to 
detect the indirect network effect, but neither is in complete form.  Between 
the two approaches, Model II outperforms Model III in terms of the goodness 
of fit. It also performs better than the simple GBM. 
 From Model IV to Model VI, we decompose the overall software 
effect to be type specific so as to examine how each type of complementary 
software influences the hardware diffusion in a specific manner. In Model IV 
where the software variety effect is captured through the external influence 
parameter hp , we find positive effect in games of Type I and Type II, but only 
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the effect of Type II is significant. Interestingly, we find negative effect of 
games of Type III, countering to what we know about the network effect 
especially when the quality of video games is under good control by the 
console makers. Despite the surprising effect found with games of Type III, 
Model IV shows a considerable improvement in explaining the data. The 
goodness of fit then increases from 0.94 in Model II to 0.97, and the objective 
function value decreases from 1.15 to 0.59. The significant improvement in 
model fitting suggests that ignoring the difference between distinct types of 
software would misguide our understanding of the characteristics of indirect 
network effect in system markets. 
In Model V where software variety effect is captured through the 
internal influence, we also find positive effect of games of Type I and Type II, 
although the effect of Type II is insignificant. The effect of games of Type III 
is still shown to be negative through internal communication. The results 
suggest that games of Type I play an important role reducing the quality 
uncertainty of hardware and accelerating the adoption process through WOM 
effect. It is true that the hardcore gamers such as teenagers and young adults 
favor the top three genres included in Type I and some genres in Type II than 
the others. Their evaluations of the quality of hardware consoles are inevitably 
influenced by the supply of their favored game genres. On the other hand, 
game genres included in Type III are the least popular genres that are hardly 
the focus of game playing. Moreover, some traditional game genres such as 
role-playing games and arcade games have a long history in the game industry, 
and the game design of those genres is not integrated with the advancement of 
hardware technology as closely as others in Type I and II.  Therefore, it is 
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highly unlikely that this type of games would reinforce the information 
exchange of consumers with previous adopters or the WOM effect. Model V 
also has a considerable improvement compared to Model III in terms of the 
goodness of fit and the objective function value, which again emphasizes the 
importance of recognizing the software variety effect in the study of indirect 
network effect in system markets.  
It is noted that the increasing supply of games of Type III might be 
considered as a sign that the hardware diffusion has reached its mature period 
and tends to slow down until replaced by a newer-generation technology. This 
speculation is partially supported by the observed historical change in the unit 
sales per title of this type of games. As can be seen in Figure 4, the unit sales 
per title for Type III are the lowest in the early stage of the hardware life cycle, 
then grow up gradually when the 6
th
-generation consoles come into the market 
(between Nov 2000 when t=66 and Nov 2001 when t=80), and reach the peak 
by the end of the observation period. This trend hardly provides any useful 
information on the popularity of the current hardware technology, instead it 
might serve as an indicator that a newer-generation technology might soon be 
available. For this reason, it is not difficult to understand why we find negative 
effect of Type III in both Model IV and Model V.   
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 Here 
     ---------------------------------------------- 
Model VI is the full model that accounts for the software variety effect 
via both external and internal influences. It confirms the positive effect of 
game Type I through internal influence, and positive effect of game Type II 
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through the external influence. The effect of games of Type III is still negative 
externally and internally, but both insignificant. Among all model 
specifications Model VI gives the best fit. In comparison, Model III and 
Model V tend to overestimate the direct network effect when the informational 
role of software in external communication channel is not recognized.  
Compared to the benchmark GBM that does not incorporate the effect 
of complementary software, Model VI improves the overall model fit 
considerably. The objective function value drops from 1.81 to 0.39, and the 
adjusted 2R improves from 0.92 to 0.97. We plot the fitted curves of these two 
models together with the true value of hardware sales in Figure 5. It shows 
that the proposed diffusion model taking into account software variety effect 
explains the hardware diffusion patterns much better than those do not, 
especially in the early periods of the hardware life cycle. With a constant level 
of external influence
0
hp , the GBM tends to overestimate the strength of 
external influence that is crucial to the initial adoption of hardware technology. 
More importantly, GBM attributes the external influence solely to the 
hardware technology, neglecting the contribution by complementary software. 
Furthermore, the proposed model is able to identify which type of software is 
more informative in reducing the uncertainty of hardware quality, which is 
crucial to the market penetration in the long run.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 Here 





 Previous studies have provided strong evidence of the existence of 
indirect network effect in system market, i.e., the demand for hardware 
platform is positively reinforced by the increasing supply of complementary 
software. It implies that hardware makers need to build a large library of 
complementary software to facilitate hardware adoption in the consumer 
market. While it is true in general, this prescription does not offer any insights 
on what to do when there are various types of software to choose from. 
 In this essay, we find that when consumers exhibit preference for 
complementary product variety, the characteristics of indirect network effect is 
a more complex issue. First, complementary software affects the diffusion of 
hardware platform through both external and internal communication channels. 
In the external channel, software supply of certain type helps to maintain 
consumer awareness of the hardware, similar to the effect of advertising. At 
the same time, certain type of software can also be a useful source of 
information to reduce the uncertainty of hardware quality. This type of 
communication is internal and induces stronger WOM effect in the market 
place. Second, not all software has the same effect on hardware adoption. The 
effect can be very different depending on which type the software is and 
which communication role it plays. We find that only games of Type I have 
strong and positive influence through internal communication channel, while 
only games of Type II show strong and positive effect through the external 
communications. The effects of Type III in both communication channels are 
insignificant. In practice, the industry also gives high priority to the game 
supply of Type I until its hardware technology moves to a newer generation. 
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The game genres in Type II (i.e., the fighting, shooter, family entertainment, 
and flight games) seem to be less intensive in game-playing experience, and 
require less interactive communication with other players to evaluate the game 
and hardware. Probably observing more games of this type coming in the 
market itself is informative enough to tell how popular the hardware console 
would be.  
The effect of Type III games is inclusive. We observe positive demand 
for games of Type III in the software market, so the insignificant impact does 
not indicate that consumers have no demand for this type of games. Based on 
the characteristics of game genres within this type, they are not the favorite 
game genres for hardcore gamers. Many of them are not closely integrated 
with the hardware technology, and hence have no effect reinforcing the WOM 
effect between game players. We suspect that this is caused by the mismatch 
between the growth pattern of this type of game and the diffusion of the 
hardware technology. According to the game unit sales per title for each type 
(Figure 4), consumer demand for this type of games seems to grow only in 
later periods when the newer-generation technology is about to come. It is 
likely that when consumers see more release of this type of game titles, they 
would assume that the current console is approaching the end of its product 
lifecycle, and a newer generation is about to come soon. 
 Unfortunately, with the reduced form model we are not able to provide 
theoretical justification for the differentiating effect of each software type we 
found in this study. It might be caused by the consumer heterogeneity in terms 
of the preference structure and characteristics of hardware adoption behavior. 
In order to further understand the hardware adoption process from the 
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individual consumer’s perspective, we will develop a structural model on 
consumer hardware choice decision to investigate the software variety effect 
again in Essay II (Chapter 5). 
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Chapter 5: An Essay on Complementary Product Variety 




In this essay, we use a structural modeling approach to the hardware 
adoption process, so as to offer a micro foundation derived from the 
underlying utility-maximizing consumers’ decision making process. Since 
consumers are the end users of both consoles and games, the adoption of a 
console itself indicates consumer adoption of a system consisting of both 
hardware and complementary software. Therefore the utility at the time of 
purchase is contributed by both hardware and software. In order to investigate 
the differential impact of software of distinctive types, we decompose the 
utility obtained from software into three parts, each indicating the utility 
obtained from having games of that particular type. The estimation results help 
us better understand how consumers choose between the competing video-
game systems. We find that 1) consumers are heterogeneous in terms of the 
preferences for hardware technology and software variety, 2) for each 
individual consumer, different type of software has distinct impact on his or 
her adoption of the hardware, and 3) at the aggregate market level, the 
differential effect of the three software types varies over time, due to the 
changing composition of the potential adopters. We conduct a series of policy 
experiments to analyze what the hardware console makers could do to 
59 
 
improve the hardware adoption rate in the early stages of the hardware life 
cycle. 
 
5.2 Model Setup 
 We consider a system market with  1{0}, Tt t tJ J J    competing 
hardware consoles from the most recent generation; each supported by a 
number of compatible game titles. These competing systems might not be 
introduced at the same time. All potential consumers intend to buy from a set 
of available systems in the newest generation, and their decision-making 
process is as follows: in each period t, a representative consumer i considers 
whether to buy a system or not, and if he or she decides to buy, which system j 
to choose from the available choice set  , based on the derived utility      from 
each choice alternative.      measures the overall attractiveness of the system j 
to consumer i at time t, and its value can be decomposed into four parts: 1) the 
value derived from hardware attributes, 2) the value derived from the 
compatible software, 3) the direct network effect derived from previous 
adopters, and 4) seasonal effect in November and December. The random 
variable jt captures the unobserved product attributes, and ijt captures the 
unobserved consumer idiosyncratic preference. Note that they are observed by 
consumers but not by econometricians. We assume jt  follows random normal 
distribution with zero mean, while ijt follows the standard Type-I extreme 
value distribution. Specifically, the utility consumer i has from choosing 
system j in time t is as 
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 _ ,( 1) _ _
hw sw
ijt ijt ijt i dne j t i nov t i dec t jt ijtu u u CS Nov Dec               (5.1) 
  
 The deterministic value derived from hardware, hwijtu , is determined by 
the intrinsic utility ij of the hardware console   which is invariant over time, 
and its price    . 
 
hw
ijt ij ip jtu p                                              (5.2) 
 In line with the theory of indirect network effects (Katz and Shapiro 
1986), the utility derived from software part 
sw
ijtu  is primarily determined by 
the number of available game titles      of each type g. Extant literature has 
used different functional forms to measure the magnitude of indirect network 
effects. Nair et al. (2004) used the nonlinear form    
  (on the basis of CES 
utility function and monopolistic competitive market for software developers) 
and found decreasing returns to scale of indirect network effect (     ) in 
the PDA market. Other researchers (e.g., Clements and Ohashi 2005, Liu 2010, 
Dubé et al. 2010) adopted a simpler linear function of the number of software, 
mostly due to identification concerns. We reconcile the identification problem 
by using the natural logarithm of     instead of     itself. In addition, we 
decompose the total number of complementary software into    distinct types 
and estimate the type-specific indirect network effect, in order to compare 
their differential effects on the system adoption decision. Understanding the 
type-specific indirect network effect is extremely useful for hardware makers 
and software developers, enabling them to allocate resources for the software 
development more efficiently. To control for the vintage effect, the title counts 
are adjusted by taking the nth-root of software title counts for those titles of n-












                                          (5.3) 
  
 The utility of not buying any of the hardware brands,      is  
 
iot iot ijtu                                                        (5.4) 
where      is normalized to zero for identification purpose.  
To control for consumer heterogeneity, we assume that there are 
  consumer segments in the market, and each consumer belongs to one of 
these segments.  Since consumers in the same segment share the common 
preference structure, each segment is characterized by a set of preference 
parameters. Hence, instead of having parameters for each individual   , we 
adopt the approach proposed by (Besanko et al. 2003) and estimate the 
preference parameters for each consumer segment  .  
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where  
 ,( 1) _ _
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 The market evolves as follows: at the time the newest generation 
system becomes available, there are a total number of    potential consumers 
of segment   in the market place. Consumers make choices according to the 
decision rule described earlier. If     is chosen, consumer i buys the system 
and leaves the market. Otherwise he or she remains in the market and go 
through the same process again in the next period. The unit sales of hardware j 






















                                        (5.8) 
 Thus, we establish an adoption model for the new adopters of the 
hardware platform in a system market. Note that we do not differentiate 
between new adopters and repeat purchasers. Given that the data used for 
estimation is from the most recent generation in the market, and the backward 
compatibility is not an issue for the two brands investigated in this study, we 
believe the carry-over effect from the earlier generation is rather limited. 
 
5.3 Demand Estimation 
5.3.1 Estimation Procedure 
 In this section we describe the model estimation based on the data of 
the 5
th
-generation video game consoles in the U.S. market. We assume the 
potential market for the 5
th
-generation video games to be 50 percent of the U.S. 
households who owned at least one television set at home (i.e., TV households) 
by January 2006, about 55 million
10
. This number is close to the total unit 
sales of the 5
th
-generation consoles up to date
11
, it is also similar to the market 
size chosen in Liu (2010) for the same video game market. In the estimation, 
however, we only used the observations from September 1995 to September 
2000for the following reason. The focus of this essay is on the effect of 
complementary product variety on consumer adoption of system hardware. It 
                                                 
10
Source: The Nielsen Company-NTI. 
11
 According to NPD, 40.9 million units of the 5
th




has critical implications to the strategic allocation of the software development 
resource in the early stage of the hardware life cycle. Therefore, the focus of 
this model is on software variety, by keeping the other factors as simple as 
possible to allow for a flexible structure for consumers’ preference for 
software variety. Since October 2000, the first 6
th
-gneration console PS2 was 
in the market, and one year later came the other two competing consoles, 
Xbox and GameCube. There were structural changes in the video game market 




 generation, which 
inevitably introduced a lot of noises in the market evolution process, such as 
consumers’ consideration set and decision rules. In order not to complicate the 
model by having too many factors in consumer demand for a system, we 
decide to only use observations when the 5
th
-generation consoles were the 
newest system in the market. In fact there were three major players in the 5
th
-
generation market, but Saturn produced by Sega was a market failure. Our 
estimation focuses on the other two major brands: PS and N64. 
 With aggregate data, we do not know the identity of each consumer, 
i.e., which segment each consumer   belongs to. Instead we can only identify 
the probability of a consumer belonging to certain segment r R .  
The unobserved product attribute jt potentially can be correlated with 
hardware price jtp  and the number of titles jgtN  of game type g. This raises the 
concerns of endogeneity that will result in inconsistent parameter estimates. 
To account for the endogeneity problem, we add a set of control functions
,( ; )jt p nCF     in the objective function equation (5.7), so that the remaining 
part jt is uncorrelated with hardware price and the numbers of game titles 




,( ; )jt jt p n jtCF                                      (5.9) 
 
 Therefore, the estimation is conducted in two stages. In the first stage, 
we regress the endogenous variables (i.e., jtp and jgtN ) on the exogenous 
variables, to get the error terms
p and n . In the second stage, we substitute 
equation (5.9) into the objective function (5.7) and estimate the structural 
model parameters together with parameter vector   for control function CF 
for each endogenous variable. For hardware price, the instrumental variables 
(IVs) include producer price indices (PPI) and their 6-month lag for computers, 
portable computers, microprocessors and storage devices. These are good cost 
indicators for the hardware production. Hardware age and installed base are 
also used. For the numbers of game titles, we only use hardware installed base 
and hardware age as the instruments. The 1
st
-stage 2R  for hardware prices is 
0.93, and for software of three types are between 0.76 and 0.90. 
 
5.3.2 Benchmark Models 
 To show how this study extends the current literature on network 
effects, I also estimate three other utility function specifications. Model I 
resembles the basic preference structure in Nair et al. (2004), Liu (2010) and 
Dubé et al. (2010), where direct network effect is not incorporated, and the 
utility from software is a simple function of the total number of software titles 
without differentiating between software types (equation (5.6.a)). We also 
build decreasing returns to scale implicitly by using the log form of software 
title counts. In this model, consumer heterogeneity is not considered. Model II 
accounts for the direct network effect (equation (5.6.b)). Model III 
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decomposes the indirect network effect into type- specific effects (equation 
(5.6.c)). In comparison, the complete Model IV takes into account both variety 
effect (i.e., the differential effect of each software type) and unobserved 
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5.4 Estimation Results 
The results of three benchmark models (Model I to III) and of the 
proposed model (Model IV) are reported in Table 5. In Model I, the parameter 
of indirect network effect sg  is positive but insignificant. When accounting 
for the direct and indirect network effects in Model II, we found both effects 
( sg  , dne ) insignificant. The two models seem to suggest that there was no 
strong direct or indirect network effect in the 5
th
-generation video game 
market, at least from the consumers’ perspective. Consumer hardware 
adoption is more heavily influenced by other factors such as brand preference, 
price sensitivity, and seasonal effect during Thanksgiving and Christmas. In 
Model III with type-specific effect of software, we find very different effect of 
each type from the other on the hardware adoption. The effects of games of 
Type I (
1sg  ) and Type III ( 3sg  ) are positive, although only that of Type I is 
significant. In contrast, the effect of games of Type II (
2sg  ) is negative. This 
negative effect provides one possible explanation for the insignificant indirect 
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network effect found in the first two models, but it is inconsistent with the 
economic theory. Thus this model is still not informative enough to tell us 
about the consumer preference of a system. Nevertheless, the other parameter 
values for price sensitivity, brand preference, direct network effect and the 
seasonal effect in Thanksgiving and Christmas are consistent with what we 
obtained earlier, and in reasonable range. It shows that when unobserved 
consumer heterogeneity is not considered, PS is more favored than N64, 
although Sony had no experience in the video game industry before producing 
its very first console PS. 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 5 Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
In Model IV, we identify two consumer segments with distinct 
preference structure for hardware technology and software variety from each 
other
12
. The preference parameters of both consumer segments are in Table 5. 
The preferences of consumers in segment one for all three types of games are 
insignificant, although the parameter for games of Type I is weakly positive. 
In contrast, the absolute value of parameters for software preference for 
consumer segment two are relatively larger, indicating that consumers in 
segment two show stronger preference for software variety, especially for 
Type I (
2, 1r sg   ) and Type III ( 2, 3r sg   ).  Regarding the preference for hardware, 
consumers in segment one put relatively higher value on hardware technology 
(
1,r PS  1, 64r N  ) than consumers in segment two ( 2,r PS  , 2, 64r N  ). At the same 
time, they are also less price sensitive than consumers in the second segment. 
                                                 
12
 We also tried the estimation with three segments, but either the parameters are mostly 
insignificant or the size of the third segment is marginal. 
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But it is worth mentioning that both consumer segments value the hardware 
designed by Nintendo slightly higher than that by Sony, which is opposite to 
what we found in the benchmark models. The findings of the insignificant 
direct network effect but strong and significant seasonal effect are consistent 
with the benchmark models. The size of the first segment is about 55% of the 
total market. 
The findings in Model IV suggest that consumers in segment one have 
strong preference for hardware technology and lower price sensitivity, so they 
are more likely to adopt a new hardware technology early. Although 
statistically insignificant, the results suggest that their interests in a system can 
only be increased by the supply of Type-I games rather than the other two. 
Type-I games (i.e., sports, action and racing games) are the most popular game 
genres, mainly because they provide intensive game-playing experience, and 
have high requirement for the hardware technology including the hardware 
processing power and storage size (Adams and Rollings 2007). So consumer 
segment one’s preference for Type-I games (if there is at all) is probably more 
driven by the game design that brings out the advancement in hardware 
technology rather than the characteristics of  contents a specific game genre 
owns. Consumers in segment two, on the other hand, care more about the 
software variety than about hardware technology. They are also more price-
sensitive. Thus they are more likely to be the late adopters. In sum, their 
interests in a game console are increased by the supply of game Type I and 
Type III, but not Type II. Based on the results, Type-II games do not provide 
extra value to consumers when they make hardware choices, and more supply 
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of this type of games might potentially hurt consumer’s incentive to buy a 
hardware console. But we cannot explain why it is the case. 
When accounting for software variety effect and the unobserved 
consumer heterogeneity, the overall model fit is improved significantly from 
0.83 to 0.93. Most structural parameters that we are interested in also make 
intuitive sense in the final model specification. In comparison to the first two 
models, the pricing effect found in the proposed model becomes much less. It 
also suggests that ignoring consumer heterogeneity tend to get confusing 
effect of the software on hardware adoption. The most interesting findings in 
this study are about the nature of direct/indirect network effects and the value 
of hardware technology from the consumer’s perspective. The results of 
Model IV show that 1) the direct network effect derived from hardware 
installed base is not significant in video game market; and 2) different types of 
software games exert distinct effects on the hardware adoption process. 
Therefore, the variety of software means more than the total number of 
software titles. Understanding consumer needs for software variety and 
providing the right type of software at the right time is more important than 
having more number of games lining up for a hardware platform to take off.  
Figure 6 to Figure 8 are the plots of the inferred hardware cumulative 
sales realized in each consumer segment. Figure 6 illustrates the change of 
adoption patterns of the 5
th
-generation consoles in each consumer segment. 
Before December 1998, the adoption made by the first segment was higher. 






Insert Figure 6 Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Figure 7 and 8 show us the adoption processes for the two competing 
brands. For PS, the early adoption was dominantly from consumer segment 
one, especially before September 1996 when N64 entered the market. Later on, 
the adoption rate of consumer segment two started to pick up, and grew much 
faster than that by the first segment. By September 2000, about 77% of unit 
sales were from consumer segment two. On the other hand, N64 attracted 
consumers mainly from consumer segment one although it entered the market 
late. Consumer segment two only contributed 26% of unit sales by the end of 
the observation period. These two figures indicate the relative preference of 
these two competing brands in different consumer segments of the video game 
market. PS was more popular for segment two, and N64 was more preferred 
by segment one. But it is not clear whether they did a good job differentiating 
from each other or not, nor do we know what they could have done differently 
to make a better outcome. Those are the issues we attempt to address in the 
next section. 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 7 & 8 Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
5.5 Policy Experiments 
 In this section, we conduct a series of counterfactual experiments to 
find out how to improve the performance of the two competing systems should 
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they aim to build up the hardware installed base effectively. Specifically, the 
analyses focus on the differential effect of each type of game to the system 
adoption process, the timing of system introduction, and the dynamics of 
software variety management. Since building up hardware installed base is 
crucial for firms in a market exhibiting network effect, these experiments all 
share the same objective-maximizing consumer adoption of the hardware 
platform.  
 
5.5.1 Effect of entry time 
Since entry timing is one of the most important strategic decisions in 
markets exhibiting network effects, this experiment attempts to answer the 
question ―What if the two competing systems entered the market 
simultaneously?‖ In this experiment, we used the original data for both brands 
in the first 49 months, and simulated the monthly unit sales based on the 
assumption that N64 was available at the same time as PS. The result shows 
that N64 would have a larger market share than PS in the early periods, 
whereas PS could only achieve higher sales in later periods. It might be 
surprising at the first glance, knowing that PS has built a much larger library 
of compatible games. But it makes perfect sense when we consider the 
characteristics of consumers in segment one who are the major adopters of 
N64 in early periods. To them, N64 has superior hardware design and lower 
hardware price. Although PS has a much larger number of compatible game 
titles, the effect of software variety is rather limited. Overall, N64 is more 
attractive to consumers in segment one who are more likely to purchase early, 
thus the early adopters who initially could only purchase PS now would switch 
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to N64. More software supply becomes a competitive advantage of PS over 
N64 only later on when consumers in segment two are more inclined to buy a 
system as the hardware price is lower and more favored types of software are 
available. Figure 9 is the plot of the cumulative sales of these two systems. It 
shows that when we move the original hardware sales curve of N64 to one 
year earlier, N64 did outperform PS for a long period of time, which is 
consistent with the result of this experiment. 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 9 Here 
--------------------------------------------- 
This experiment also points out one of the crucial factors to success in 
markets with network effects: the first-mover advantage. If N64 introduced its 
new-generation gadget the same time as PS, it could have become the market 
leader at least for the first 18 months (Figure 10), and have gained another 3.5 
million unit sales during the first four years of its hardware life cycle! 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 10 Here 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
5.5.2 How important is one extra game to a system adoption 
process? 
 In this experiment, we aim to examine the marginal impact of 
introducing a new software game of different types, and how its impact 
changes with respect to the type of the game, the time of introduction, and the 
variety of current games available in the market. As indicated in the model 
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specification, the marginal impact of a new game title is highly dynamic, 
which depends on the relative size of each consumer segments as well as the 
existing number of software games available. To simplify the computation 
burden involved in the software vintage effect, but still provide insights on the 
marginal impact of different types of games to the demand for a system, we 
assume that the life time of a new game is only one month. Conditional on the 
variety of software given in each month, we used simulation to compute how 
many more or less units would be sold in accumulation for the focal brand and 
competing brand by the end of the observation period, if one more title of 
Type I or Type III were to be introduced by the focal brand at different point 
in time. We no longer assume the simultaneous entry of the two brands. 
 Since the first type of games shows positive effect on the system 
adoption in both consumer segments, we first examine how much the 
cumulative sales could be increased (or decreased) for both brands if PS were 
able to produce one more game of Type I, and how this change in cumulative 
sales would differ with respect to the change of the introduction date of the 
extra game. The result shows that by the end of the observation period, PS 
would be able to generate positive sales in each month should it provide more 
games of Type I, and the increased sales are mainly stolen from its rival N64. 
Moreover, the gains become larger as the time of software introduction is in 
later period (The change in cumulative sales of both brands can be found in 
Figure 11). When we decompose the increased sales into different consumer 
segments, we find that the increase is mainly from consumer segment two. 
Similar effects are found for N64 (Figure 12).  This effect is due to the fact 
that game Type I is a favored game type for both consumer segments. 
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Increasing supply of Type-I game will increase the attractiveness of the focal 
brand and reduce the relative value of the competing brand at the same time. 
Therefore business stealing effect dominates the market expansion effect.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 11 & 12 Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Because the preference for game Type II is statistically insignificant, 
we neglect the analysis of its marginal effect.   
The effect of game Type III is very different from that of Type I, due 
to the fact that it is only preferred by consumer segment two. Figure 13 shows 
the marginal effect of game Type III on the cumulative sales of both brands 
when PS provides one more game of this type. Initially it only introduces 
negative but insignificant effect on the hardware sales, because the early 
adopters are not interested in this game type. Later on the effect becomes 
positive as more and more consumers from segment two make purchases. On 
the other hand, as shown in Figure 14, the marginal effect of games of Type 
III remains negative for N64 even till the end of the observation period, if N64 
introduces more games of this type. The net loss is mainly because the loss 
generated from consumer segment one is larger than the gains from segment 
two. However, since the negative effect on segment one is insignificant, and 
the gains in segment two is less than the loss in segment one, the overall effect 
of game Type III on N64 is insignificant. 
---------------------------------------------- 





5.5.3 How to allocate software to different types efficiently? 
From the previous analysis, we learn that both brands have shown 
some relative advantages over the other, and they have attracted different 
types of consumers. PS is more attractive to consumer segment two, in that it 
provides a greater number of games of Type I and Type III in comparison to 
N64. N64, on the other hand, is more favored by consumer segment one, 
because it has a better hardware design and sufficient number of games of 
Type I to play on the console, although the number of titles is not as much as 
its rival brand. At the same time, both brands have provided considerable 
resources developing games of Type II, which shows no significant effect 
facilitating the adoption of hardware console.  
Given the consumer preference structure and each brand’s relative 
advantages and weakness, we are interested in knowing how these two brands 
could manage the software variety differently to improve their market 
performance.   
By providing games only of Type I, N64 not only could maintain its 
competitive advantage among consumers in segment one, but also could 
increase its value to the consumers in segment two, which would lead to a 
higher adoption rate in both consumer segments, and lower the relative 
advantage of PS in consumer segment two. Therefore, N64 should only 
provide games of Type I.  
The optimal approach for PS is less straightforward. It entered the 
market one year earlier than N64. During this time period, consumers in 
segment one had to purchase from PS, and consumer segment two also shows 
75 
 
relatively higher elasticity to game Type I. So in the first 12 months, PS 
should also provide games only of Type I, to maximize the adoption rate in 
both consumer segments. After the presence of N64, PS faced a more complex 
problem on when to provide games of Type III and how many game titles to 
provide. In the simulation, we recursively assigned each title to the type that 
would generate the highest marginal gains to the platform. The result shows 
that the first time to provide games of Type III is in November 1996, mainly 
due to the strong demand generated in Thanksgiving and Christmas season. 
Then it should not be in supply until August 1997, about two years after the 
debut of PS, or one year after its own launch. The software variety 
adjustments for both brands are illustrated in Figure 15 and 16 respectively. 
With the adjusted software supply, the hardware sales for both brands are 
improved, especially in early periods. According to Figure 17, PS should be 
able to sell another 1.75 million units, and N64 could also generate another 1 
million unit sales by September 2000. Figure 18 shows that PS would remain 
as the market leader throughout. 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 15, 16, 17and 18 Here 
   --------------------------------------------------- 
  
5.6 Discussion 
In this essay, we use structural modeling approach to investigate the 
characteristics of consumers’ preference for a system when they make 
hardware purchase decisions. One of the major findings is that consumers are 
heterogeneous in their preferences for the hardware technology and 
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complementary software variety. Part of the potential consumers (i.e., 
consumers in segment one) value the advancement of hardware technology; 
they are also less price sensitive, and show no significant preference for 
software variety. Hence they are more likely to purchase early. In comparison, 
consumers in the other segment are less interested in the hardware technology 
but more interested in software variety; they show strong preference for games 
of Type I (including sports, action and racing games) and comparatively weak 
preference for games of Type III (including arcade, strategy, and role-playing 
games, etc); they are also relatively more price sensitive, thus more likely to 
purchase in later periods. Those findings provide a baseline for us to 
understand the purchase patterns of video game players, especially the relation 
between hardware and software during the hardware purchase process. 
  The first experiment shows that entry timing is important even when 
there is no direct network effect. It matters when the hardware firms compete 
for the same consumer segment(s). Because N64 is more favored by 
consumers in segment one who favor technology advancement and care less 
about price or software variety, it lost one year of sales to PS due to its late 
entry. 
Experiment two delivers an important message that the indirect 
network effect of software on hardware adoption might not be carried over by 
all software types. There are two reasons for it: First, some consumers (i.e., 
consumers in segment one) are not variety seeking for software, so increasing 
software supply does not have significant impact on the adoption of hardware. 
Even if it does, probably the effect is not derived merely from having a new 
software title per se, it is more likely due to the design of the game that is well 
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integrated with the advancement of hardware technology and improves the 
game-playing experience. Second, for consumers who are variety seeking, 
they only prefer certain types of software but not all. Then the indirect 
network effect that will induce more hardware adoption can only be generated 
by providing the right type of software that consumers expect to have when 
they make hardware purchase decisions. In such market condition, providing 
as many game titles as possible without considering their effectiveness could 
only cause inefficient use of resource for software development, and possibly 
lose the competition with other hardware platforms. The hardware firms 
should spend more effort developing quality games of the right type to target 
the right consumer segment at different stage of the product life cycle. This is 
one of the reasons that PS did not take over the total market even though its 
library size of compatible games is much larger than its opponent N64. 
Experiment three demonstrates the complexity of software variety 
management when consumers are variety seeking across several types of 
software but to different extents. The result shows that game Type I is the 
most important one among the three major types, followed by game Type III. 
Game Type II does not show significant effect of increasing the attractiveness 
of a system when consumers make hardware adoptions. Consequently, the 
hardware firms should first make sure to provide sufficient number of games 
of Type I in the early stage of the hardware life cycle. Type III games should 
be introduced gradually later on as the marginal effect of Type I game goes 
down. As such, the management of software variety is a dynamic process, 
with changing combination of different types of software to be introduced at 
different stages of the hardware life cycle. It is not a simple task of ―producing 
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as many software apps as possible‖. To maximize the hardware adoption 
speed in a market place, a solid management of complementary software 
requires the firms to provide the right type of software at the right time with 




Chapter 6: An Essay on the Effect of Complementary 
Product Variety on Co-Diffusion in Two-Sided Market 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 In Essay I & II, we empirically investigate how different types of 
software influence consumer demand for hardware in the video game market. 
The results show that at the aggregate market level, increasing the supply of 
software may or may not be conducive to the hardware adoption process, 
depending on which type the software belongs to. The indirect network effect 
of each type of software can be explained by the informational (or 
communicational) role the software carries during the hardware diffusion. In 
Essay II, the strength of indirect network effect of each software type is 
derived from the consumer utility function, and the result suggests that 
consumers are variety seeking only for certain types of software but not across 
all. Further, the variety effect of complementary software is highly dynamic. It 
is a challenge for hardware makers to provide the right combination of various 
types of software so as to maximize the growth of hardware installed base.  
To establish a successful platform in a two-sided market, having a 
good understanding of consumers demand only accomplishes half of the task. 
It is equally important to know the characteristics of software developers and 
their demand for the hardware platform, i.e., how their incentives to join the 
platform are affected by consumers’ choices. Only then can we draw a 
complete picture of the market, and look for appropriate approaches to 
internalizing the externalities between consumers and software developers.  
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 In this essay, we aim to examine the variety effect in a two-sided 
market framework, and propose a co-diffusion model to examine the 
interactions between the two parties. The focus of this study is on the nature of 
indirect network effect on software developers. Depending on which type of 
software the developer is specialized in, the effect of consumer adoption of 
hardware on the developer’s tendency to join in might differ as well. 
This essay is organized as follows. We demonstrate the model setup in 
section 6.2, and report the estimation results in section 6.3. We then discuss 
the findings and their managerial implications in section 6.4. 
 
6.2 Model 
 We first model the adoption externalities that game developers exert to 
induce consumers to adopt the compatible hardware. Its functional form is the 
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 As in equation (4.1) of Essay I, sgtCN is the cumulative number of 
software of type g observed in period t. 0
sgTN is the total number of software 
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type g that could ―potentially‖ be available when the software market is fully 
penetrated. Note that this differs from the definition of sgTN in Essay I 
wherein it is the observed total number of software developed for type g by the 
end of the hardware life cycle. This is because in this model we have a system 
of equations to capture the co-adoption process of consumers and software 
developers. The co-movement of both parties allows us to infer the potential 
size of the software market even though it is not observable, which cannot be 
achieved with only the model of consumer adoption process as in Essay I. 
Therefore, the total market size TN0
sg
 of software type g in this model is a 
parameter to be estimated instead of a number directly observed in the data. 
We also consider the specification with the market size of software type g – 
TNt
sg
 – to evolve over time as a function of the hardware installed base
1
h
tCS  . 
We will explain the formulation of TNt
sg
 in detail in the model of developers’ 
adoption process.  
 The hardware adoption by software developers constitutes the other 
side of a two-sided market. Although in reality each developer can produce 
multiple software products, as we model the process of developers adopting 
the hardware platform, our true interest is to know how many software titles 
could be introduced as the hardware installed base grows. We use the same 
assumption in Essay I that each software development company only produces 
one software title. The introduction of one software title means one developer 
has adopted the compatible hardware platform. The adoption rate by software 
developers in discrete form is  
   11 1
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tN  is the number of new software of type g introduced in period t.
sgp
and sgq are the diffusion parameters for the adoption process by developers of 
type g. The diffusion parameter sgp  reflects the initial belief of the developers 
on how well the platform would perform in the future, which would determine 
their adoption rate in the early stage. It also measures the size of developers 
who have committed to the new technology before a considerable number of 
developers have already chosen to work with the new platform technology. 
This is the commitment in terms of delivering a new product at certain point in 
time. The parameter sgq for developers can be explained as the effect of 
internal communication on the developers’ adoption rate. The most influential 
information would be how many of other developers have adopted the same 
technology. Similar to consumers, it can be considered as a measure of the 




dec are the parameters for the seasonal effect. 
The i.i.d. random variable 2~ (0, )sgt sgN  captures the random shock 
happened in the diffusion process denoted as sg. 
The adoption externalities that software developers benefit from the 
consumer side are captured in a different form. Instead of taking effect 
through the communication channels, we model the effect through the growth 
of active market size of software and their developers. We use this setup for 
two reasons. First, the institutional adoption process (by developers) involves 
more planning and strategic moves. Thus its diffusion curve is less sensitive to 
the change of hardware installed base, and is difficult to incorporate the 




 like in 
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equation (6.2) and (6.3). Second, the observed sg
tN  is highly fluctuating over 
time and its cumulative curve is hardly an ―S‖ curve 13 . Given the 
characteristics of the data for equation (6.4), it is difficult to identify the 
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As indicated in equation (6.5), a growing hardware installed base 
1
h
tCS   
will lead to a larger active market of software type g, sg
tTN . Parameter 0
sgTN
represents the total number of software of type g that the developers are 
willing to produce when all consumers in the potential market have adopted 
the hardware platform. Equation (6.5) also reflects the characteristic of 
commitment by software developers. Before the hardware launch, i.e. when
( ) 0hF t  , some developers have already committed to the hardware platform. 
As the hardware installed base grows, the number of consumers ready for 
software purchase also grows, which in turn should increase the probability of 
software developers to join the market. This indirect network effect is captured 
by parameter sg
h which measures the rate of transiting from the state of ―no 
interest in the platform‖ to the state of ―being interested‖. Therefore, a positive 
sg
h indicates the existence of positive indirect network effect, and the larger 
sg
h is, the faster software developers would transit to the active state.  
                                                 
13
 Note that even with the fluctuating data, Bass model is still our better choice compared to 
other diffusion models such as negative exponential (when q=0), logistic model (when p=0), 
and Weilbull model. Weilbull model does not provide managerial implications as the Bass 
model does, and its parameters are difficult (if not impossible) to associate with the direct 
network effect that we want to capture in the diffusion process.    
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 Equation (6.2), (6.3) and (6.5) jointly define the two-way adoption 
externalities (or indirect network effect) in a two-sided market. Built upon the 
model analysis in Essay I, we further examine the variety effect on developers’ 
side, and see how the interactive relations between consumers and software 
developers differ with respect to their types.  
 
6.3 Estimation and Results 
We estimate the co-diffusion process in video game market using the 
GMM method, with the Bartlett kernel to control for the serial correlations 
that potentially present in the estimation errors. We account for the 
endogeneity of hardware price via the instrumental variable technique, with 
the same set of instrument variables as in Essay I. 
To have a clear picture of how indirect network effect influences the 
adoption process in both sides of the market, we first estimate a benchmark 
model with no indirect network effect explicitly built in (Model I), and its 
result is in Table 6. In Model II we only consider the one-way network effect 
by adding the effect of software availability on consumer adoption process 
(i.e., equation (6.1)), and the result is in Table 7. We then report the result of 
the proposed model with two-way interactions in Table 8. 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
Overall, the estimates in Table 6 show that the adoption processes of 
both parties can be captured fairly well with the GBM structure. As we have 
known, consumer adoption process is smoother and thus its goodness of fit is 
85 
 
0.92, much higher than that for the software developers. Among the three 
types of games, Type I has the highest market potential, about 917 titles, 
followed by Type II (496 titles) and Type III (364 titles). In addition, the 
adoption process for consumers and software developers both present strong 
seasonal effect during November and December. Consumers have stronger 
demand in December than in November. It is the opposite for developers, 
probably to fully take advantage of the holiday season, as it takes time to 
develop and introduce a game. A significantly larger number of game titles 
were released in November than in December.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
The result of Model II is similar to what we obtained in Essay I with a 
few exceptions. In Essay I, we found that the effects of Type-I game in the 
external communication channel and of Type-II game in external channel are 
both negative but insignificant. In Model II when the diffusion of hardware 
technology on consumers’ side recognizes the indirect network effect from 
software developers, these effects become significant. At the same time, we 
find positive and significant effect of games of Type III through the external 
communication.  The result suggests that games of Type I and Type III either 
have mixing effects on consumer adoption process or only impact significantly 
in one specific channel of communication. In general, the findings on software 
variety effect are consistent with the results in Essay I. In comparison to the 
benchmark Model I in this essay, the adjusted R
2
 on consumers’ side is 
improved from 0.92 to 0.94, and the goodness of fit of the models on 
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developers’ side remains the same. The overall objective function value also 
decreases from 35.14 to 31.75.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 8 Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
The result of the proposed model is in Table 8, which shows the 
characteristics of two-way adoption externalities in the 5
th
 generation video 
game market. The software variety effect on consumers is basically the same 
as what we found in Essay I. Software Type I shows positive and significant 
effect on hardware adoption through the internal communication, whereas 
Type II shows positive and significant effect through the external 
communication. The effect of Type III in neither communication channel is 
significant.  
As for the software developers, the result shows that all three types of 
developers are positively influenced by the consumer adoption. More supply 
of software by the developers is activated when the increased hardware 
installed base makes the platform more attractive. Among them Type I 
receives the strongest effect and Type II shows the weakest. Although Type III 
has the smallest market size and shows no significant effect on consumer 
adoption, the effect it receives from the consumer side is quite strong.  
The estimated sizes of potential consumers as well as software titles 
(or developers) in this model are much larger than in previous estimations 
when the two-way adoption externalities are not or only partly incorporated. 
The potential market for hardware console in the consumer market hM
increases from about 52 million to 177.59 million. The potential size for game 
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Type I increases from 915 titles in Model II to 2037, from 493 to 937 for Type 
II, and from 361 to 756 for Type III. Comparing the estimated number with 
the observed number, we find only 44% (=897/2037) of games of Type I, 51% 
(=482/937) of Type II, and 47% (=347/756) of Type III are actually provided 
in the market place.  
In comparison to the two benchmark models, the proposed model 
accounting for the adoption externalities between the two parties leads to 
better model fits in the adoption processes of all type of software developers, 
as well as the overall model fit of the co-diffusion process. However, the 
model fit for consumer adoption process seems to be lower than in Benchmark 
Model II. Our further investigation shows that when we use the active 
software market size sg
tTN instead of the total market sizes 0
sgTN  in the 
consumer adoption process (i.e., equation (6.1)), the model’s goodness of fit 
becomes better than Benchmark Model II (Table 9). But the parameters on 
software variety effect all become insignificant, even though their values are 
mostly close to the model with a fixed market size 
0
sgTN . Another difference 
from the result in Table 8 is that the estimated sizes of potential market on 
both sides are smaller. Those changes in estimation results imply that our 
model structure is able to capture the interaction process. The two 
specifications for the effect of software availability on consumer adoption are 
consistent, although with slight difference in the magnitude of the potential 
market size.  In the following analysis, we adopt the fixed market size 0
sgTN






Insert Table 9 Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
 Overall, the proposed model fits reasonably well with the data in video 
game market, and describes the consumer adoptions and hardware unit sales 
very well. Developers’ adoption process of each type has relatively lower 
fitting, mainly because the data on the number of new games introduced in 
each month is not as smooth as hardware unit sales. As shown in Figure 19, 
the variations are large even not in Novembers or Decembers. Due to the sheer 
size of parameters to be estimated, adding more seasonal dummies in the 
model makes it harder to detect any adoption externalities and other 
parameters. Furthermore, the supply of new game titles is too low in the first 
few months, and it drops dramatically in late periods. For this reason, we have 
excluded observations after April 2004 when the supply of new games nearly 
stopped, which was about one year before the launch of the first 6
th
-generation 
console in November 2005. Fortunately, the information contained in the 
current data is still good enough to enable us to identify the interactions 
between consumers and game developers. 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 19 Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Figure 20 is the plot of the cumulative distribution functions for the 
three software types to provide us a better visualization of the relative strength 
of indirect network effect on those developers. We can see that when the 
hardware installed base is zero, all three types of developers are already 
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partially activated. When the hardware installed base grows, more developers 
get on board and more games become potentially available to consumers. The 
first panel shows the growth rate of active market as the hardware installed 
base increases, and the second shows the growth in absolute values. In terms 
of the relative size of the active market compared to the total market, Type I 
has the highest growth rate, followed by Type III and Type II. In terms of the 
absolute value in the active market size, Type I remains the highest. Type II 
has the second highest response to the hardware installed base, given its larger 
potential market size than that of Type III. This effect in absolute value is in 
line with the observed number of games provided from these three types. 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 20 Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
The most important statistic in the two-sided market is the elasticity of 
demand on one side with respect to the number of agents signed up for the 
same platform on the other. It is an indicator of who derives larger utility from 
entering the market, and thus is more willing to pay for the entry. In a dynamic 
two-sided market with changing number of ―members‖ over time, the 
elasticity varies at different stages of the hardware diffusion process. Figure 21 
illustrates the trajectories of the elasticities of three game types in the 5
th
 
generation video game market, as the hardware installed base grew over time.  
The first panel is for the whole observation time span, and it shows that there 
is a structural change since November 2000 when the newer generation started. 
The elasticities of software developers adopting the platform are much lower 
before the structural change, and then shoot up rapidly afterwards (from 10-20% 
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to more than 100% in non-holiday seasons). This pattern holds for all three 
game types, suggesting that the developers are more sensitive to the growth of 
the hardware installed base of the existing technology when a newer 
technology is about to replace the existing one. It makes intuitive sense, and 
explains why the introduction of new games started to slow down when the 
existing technology overlaps with the newer one. The second panel shows that 
before the structural change the elasticities of software supply also grow 
gradually. Among the three, Type I is the most responsive up to the end of 
1997, and then Type II steps up and is on a par with Type I. Type III has the 
lowest elasticity throughout the process.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 21 Here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
Compared with the software developers, the elasticities of consumer 
adoption with respect to the supply of game Type I and Type II are much 
lower, always equal to or less than one. The trajectories of the elasticities also 
present different patterns for the two software types. Consumer demand for 
hardware (or hardware unit sales) became more elastic with the supply of 
game Type I until the end of 2000, and then gradually lowered down when 
newer-generation came into the market. As for Type II, the elasticities fell 
rapidly in about two years and phased out. Because the effect of game Type III 












 In this essay, we provide a framework to model the co-diffusion 
process by consumers and software developers, aiming to investigate their 
adoption externalities when they choose the hardware platform. Furthermore, 
its flexible structure allows us to examine how their interactive relationship 
changes with the type of software when consumers present preference for 
complementary product variety.  
In the hardware adoption process, consumers respond to the supply of 
each type of game differently, whereas the software developers show similar 
responses to the consumer adoption process. Type I games facilitate the WOM 
communication between adopters and potential consumers. The elasticity of 
consumer demand for hardware with respect to the supply of game Type I also 
follows a bell-shaped curve along the hardware life cycle. This means in the 
early stage of the hardware adoption process, the effectiveness of Type I 
games to induce hardware adoption first increases with the growth of 
hardware installed base, and then drops gradually after a newer generation 
technology is available. Conversely, the supply of Type I games is the most 
responsive to consumer adoption among all three types. Given that this type 
also has the largest potential market size, it is evident that Type I is the most 
important game type to multiply the adoption process of a new hardware 
technology. As for Type II games, they help improve consumer adoption of 
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hardware mainly in the early stage by maintaining consumer awareness of the 
system. Conversely, the strength of adoption externalities they receive from 
the consumer adoption are the lowest, based on the transition rate of active 
market size with respect to the hardware installed base. Nevertheless, game 
supply of this type is still highly responsive to the hardware unit sales. In fact, 
developers of this type provided a larger number of games than those of Type 
III. Furthermore, we do not find significant two-way adoption externalities 
between developers of game Type III and consumers. The supply of Type III 
games is strongly influenced by consumer adoption of hardware platform, but 
consumers do not significantly become more active in the adoption process 
when games of this type are provided. Comparing the coefficients in Table 6 
and 7, we can see that whether consumers respond positively or negatively to 
the supply of games of Type III is inclusive. But it is obvious that the 
developers of game Type III rely on the indirect network effect from the 
hardware installed base to remain active. 
The varying patterns of interactive relationships suggest that when 
consumers exhibit preference for complementary product variety in a system 
market, a typical two-sided market framework without differentiating type-
specific effects is unable to provide a complete picture of the relationships 
between consumers and complementary product providers. A more flexible 
structure as shown in Figure 2 is critical to help us identify distinctive 
interactive relationship between consumers and various types of software (and 
their developers). Most studies that treat a software title the same as any other 
only give us the overall effect combined from various sources, which could be 
misguiding and leads to inefficient resource allocation for software 
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development. For example, it is not optimal to provide games of Type III in 
the early stage of the hardware life cycle, because it does not help the 
hardware firms to achieve the main objective—to increase consumer adoption 
speed, and it is hard to motivate the developers of this type when the hardware 
installed base is not high enough.  
The reason that we only pointed out the asymmetry of the two-way 
interaction without drawing other implications is that there are still patterns of 
the developers’ behavior that cannot be explained by the co-diffusion model. 
In order to further discuss the possible strategic changes by the developers, we 
need a model that can describe the market well. We will continue looking for 
suitable models to better describe the fluctuations in the developers’ adoption 
process.  
Note that this model only investigates the adoption of hardware 
platform by two parties. In a system market consisting of hardware platform 
and complementary software, consumers have demand for both hardware and 
software. Hence the finding that Type III games have no significant effect on 
consumer demand for hardware does not mean that consumers do not have 
demand for those games. The demand for hardware and that for software are 
two different issues. This thesis only focuses on the demand for hardware.  
Potentially these two aspects of consumer demand can be studied in a 
single model framework to provide a complete picture of how a system works. 
After all, the only reason that developers want to join the platform is to sell its 
software to consumers. In most system markets, consumers adopt a platform 
for the consumption of its complementary software and content services. With 
such a complete model, we shall be able to give a better explanation why there 
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are so many software titles such as games of Type III in video game market, 
even though they do not provide much value to the consumer adoption of 
hardware platform. It is a promising area for future research.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 In this thesis, we have conducted a series of studies to investigate the 
variety effect of complementary products in a system market, where the 
continual supply of complementary products is heavily influenced by the 
diffusion of platform adoption by consumers. In Essay I and II, we looked into 
the platform adoption at both macro and micro level, and explained the variety 
effect of complementary products supply on hardware adoption from different 
perspectives. We found that when consumers are variety seeking for the 
complementary products, the variety management is highly dynamic, mainly 
because consumers are heterogeneous, either in terms of their adoption 
tendency or in terms of the preference across software types. Then in Essay III, 
we examined the interactive relationship between consumers and 
complementary product developers in a more flexible two-sided framework, 
and unveiled the cross elasticities of one party’s join-in decision with respect 
to the other. Based on the video game data, the estimation results showed that 
the relationship between consumers and various types of software developers 
is much more complex than what have been discussed in the network effect 
literature.  
 First, although it is generally true that more supply of complementary 
software has a positive effect on hardware adoption, that effect of different 
software types may not be the same. We examined the roles of different types 
of software and the discrepancies of their effects in two approaches. The first 
is in line with the information spillover in the diffusion of innovations. It 
suggests that some software (i.e., game Type I in the video game market) is 
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most critical to the hardware adoption in that they serve to reduce the 
uncertainty of hardware technology and expedite the WOM effect in the 
diffusion of new hardware technology, whilst some others (i.e., game Type II) 
help maintain consumer awareness. There is also some software which has no 
significant effect on the hardware adoption by consumers. Those distinct 
effects are partially validated in Essay II, which took a different perspective 
and modeling approach. In this essay, we treated the number of software titles 
available for each type as an attribute of the system, and then investigated how 
consumers evaluate those attributes when they make hardware adoptions and 
how their preferences differ with different consumer segments. The results 
indicate that those consumers who tend to make early purchase have no 
significant preference for any software variety, and those who tend to purchase 
late value the software of Type I the most. It is consistent with the findings in 
Essay I that Type I software has a significant effect of multiplying WOM 
communications and thus improves hardware adoption. Further, software Type 
III only has weak effect on the second consumer segment, and software Type 
II has no effect in either segment. The type-specific effects of software Type II 
and Type III are not consistent with what we found in Essay I, but they are 
similar in the sense that these two types of software have weak effect on 
hardware purchase by consumers and should not be the main focus of variety 
management of complementary software.  
In the past, it seemed to have reached a conclusion that there is always 
positive network effect between the consumer demand for hardware and the 
supply of complementary software. This thesis shows that it might not be true 
if we look deeper into the type-specific effect. The positive indirect network 
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effect is just the overall effect aggregated up from all kinds of software titles. 
This composite effect does not provide insights into the variety management 
of complementary software when hardware makers need to decide on what 
type (or types) of complementary products should be produced and how many 
varieties are required to reach the hardware sales target. Providing those 
software titles belonging to the genres that are unlikely to boost up consumer 
demand for the hardware only makes the platform dull and unattractive. It is 
necessary to look into the effect of different types of software so as to provide 
the right type of software to the target consumers. Due to its strategic 
importance in marketing management, more empirical studies on the effect of 
complementary product variety should be conducted in other system markets. 
 Second, consumer heterogeneity has shown to have great implications 
to a system market and the management of its complementary product variety. 
When consumers are heterogeneous in their preference for hardware 
technology and software variety, the hardware maker should have a clear idea 
of who the target consumers are and what kind of system they would like to 
have. In order to do so, the firm needs to have a good understanding of their 
preference structure, and provides the right type(s) of software accordingly. In 
Essay II, we find that both PS and N64 could have made a more effective plan 
of software development for target market penetration. More importantly, 
even if a hardware technology enters the market early, this resource 
misallocation to the wrong type of software may give the competing 
technology a chance to outperform without the first-mover advantage. PS was 
introduced to the market one year before its opponent N64. During this period, 
almost all of the consumers with hardware purchase intention were from 
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consumer segment one. PS should have provided only the quality games of 
Type I that its potential consumers prefer (albeit insignificant). Then after the 
launch of N64, it should have shifted focus on consumer segment two to avoid 
the head-to-head competition, and had a more careful distribution of games 
between Type I and Type III. In comparison, since Nintendo was found to be 
more favored by consumers of segment one, it should have put more resource 
on the development of Type I games. Having too many games of Type II or 
Type III did not make Nintendo more attractive than PS in the target market, 
given that the games of these two types are far less integrated with the 
hardware technology than Type I. 
 With the identified consumer preference structure, the competitive 
advantages of two consoles—PS and N64 have become clear. We found that 
the hardware technology of PS is evaluated to be lower than that of N64 in 
both consumer segments, and it also has a less effective software variety 
management, probably because it is the first console Sony made in video game 
market as a newcomer. Nevertheless, Sony’s PS won the battle and became 
the market leader by launching its hardware one year ahead of Nintendo, and 
by providing a much larger number of games in every genre. The total number 
of game titles for PS was 14 in the first month and it exploded to 781 by 
September 2000. In comparison, the number of games available for N64 was 
only 6 in its first month and reached merely 265 by then. Even so, Nintendo 
could have dominated the market since day one with its original portfolio of 
software (i.e., the same total number and composition of different games), 
should it entered the market at the same time as PS! The seemingly shocking 
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conclusion obtained from the policy experiments reveals the compelling 
power of variety management in a system market! 
 Third, we have proposed a co-diffusion model in essay three to study 
the interactive relationship between consumers and different types of software 
developers. The results suggest that in video game market, it is not always true 
to have positive two-way adoption externalities between the two parties, 
mainly due to the effect of complementary product variety on consumer 
adoption of hardware, i.e., different types of software games are not treated 
equally by the consumers when they make hardware adoptions. Positive two-
way adoption externalities are found between consumers and developers of 
software Type I as well as consumers and developers of Type II. Due to the 
insignificant effect of Type III games on consumer demand for hardware, 
there is only one-way effect of consumer adoption on the supply of Type III 
games but not the opposite. Even for the first two pairs of agents with positive 
externalities on both sides, the characteristics of their interactive relationships 
also differ. Based on the adoption elasticities of agents on one side of the 
platform with respect to the adoption rate on the other side, the effect of Type 
I games on consumer adoption of hardware follows a bell-shape curve along 
the hardware life cycle, whereas the effect of Type II games decreases 
exponentially. Consumer adoption rate, on the other hand, has a consistent 
effect on software supply of all three types. The elasticity of software supply 
of all types increases over time even after the introduction of a newer 
generation technology.  
The highly dynamic interactions identified in the co-diffusion process 
provide a guideline to the hardware firm on to which party it should pay more 
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attention to balance the market demand for its platform at different stages of 
the hardware life cycle. The elasticities of each party on their demand for the 
hardware platform suggest the following: it is important to have enough 
number of software of Type II to boost up consumer adoption process at the 
initial stage. At the same time, the hardware maker should constantly pay 
attention to the supply of software Type I so as to accelerate the WOM effect 
and to reduce the consumer uncertainty on the hardware technology. By the 
time a newer generation technology is ready for release, software Type I is 
still an effective tool to keep the sales of its old platform moving for certain 
period of time, which allows it to make a more stable transition to the next 
generation. At the same time, the task of motivating software developers to 
join the platform gets easier as the hardware installed base grows.  
 Fourth, it is possible that the direct and indirect network effects both 
exist in system markets. Marketing researchers and practitioners need to know 
whether it is both types of network effects or only one type that has significant 
impact on the platform adoption process, and which one is more salient. These 
are empirical questions worth investigation in every system market, as the two 
types of network effects have very different market implications. Very often 
the empirical studies in marketing and economics literature only consider one 
type of network effect, or use a reduced-form model to capture both effects 
with one variable, which loses the ability to test whether it is the direct or 
indirect network effect that is dominant in the market interactions. We used 
models that are able to disentangle the effect of either type, and found that the 
video game market is dominated by the indirect network effect. On the other 
hand, those consumer adoption models neglecting software variety effect or 
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unobserved consumer heterogeneity would indicate the existence of both types 
of network effects. We do not know to what extent it is generally true in other 
system markets. It calls for more empirical studies for other markets to find 
out whether our finding is specific to the video game market or is generally 
true. More importantly, a model that is able to differentiate between these two 
types of effects is necessary for us to have a better understanding of the market 
dynamics.  
 One of the reasons to have both Essay I and II on the hardware 
adoption process is to cross validate the effect of complementary product 
variety from different research angles. Unfortunately, the results obtained 
from the two studies are not entirely consistent. Only the effect of software 
Type I is consistently positive across both studies, but it is not so for the effect 
of the other two types of software games. We have tried the brand-level 
diffusion model with variety effect, and the parameter values follow the same 
pattern as in Essay I. The model we used for estimation is a modified version 
of the brand diffusion model in Krishnan et al. (2000). So we have ruled out 
the possible reason of modeling at different product level (category vs. brand). 
One reason might be that we are only able to identify two consumer segments 
in Essay II, whereas the diffusion model by nature is able to capture a 
continuously heterogeneous population of consumers.  To able to do that, a 
replacement model is required to capture consumers’ adoption behavior in the 
whole hardware life cycle. We are going to investigate this matter in future 
research works. 
 Note that in this thesis, we only investigate the demand for hardware 
platform in a system market. Consumers in such market also have demand for 
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software. It is beyond the research scope of this thesis. In future research, we 
hope to build a structural model for system market incorporating consumer 
demand for both hardware and software, to have a better understanding of 
consumer decision-making process in system markets. It is a promising area 
because the current model can identify the adoption externalities, but it does 
not give us enough freedom to do policy experiments and find out how to 
internalize the externalities with proper pricing strategy on each party, nor do 
we know whether it is efficient or socially optimal. Structural model is also a 
useful tool to allow us to find efficient contract with software developers, to 
strategically control the software variety for a hardware platform. 
  There is another extension worth exploring. It is noted that we do not 
investigate the interactions among the software group themselves. By doing so, 
it will make a multi-sided market structure. The challenge with this structure 
lies in the difficulty to identify many interactions with multiple parties in one 
framework, without jeopardizing its power to describe a system market. Since 
the focus of this study is on the interactions between consumers and game 
developers, we believe the identified adoption externalities between the two 
parties are not going to be affected much by the neglect of interactions 
between software developers. Nevertheless, it is an interesting topic to explore, 
both from substantive and methodological point of view. 
 To our knowledge, this is the first study investigating the variety effect 
in two-sided market and diffusion literature. It is a new area with many 
interesting issues to be explored, such as the overlapping generation 
management in system markets, system markets with forward-looking agents, 
etc. These topics are highly relevant to marketing practice in the field. We 
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wish more researches on system markets and related issues will be motivated 
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Table 1. Descriptive data summary on the 5
th
-generation video game market 
 
Data History May 1995 - Dec 2004 
Data Length 116 months 
Console Names 
Saturn by Sega (May 1995 - ) 
PS by Sony (Sep 1995 - ) 
N64 by Nintendo (Sep 1996 - ) 
U.S. TV Household Population (million) 108.4    (Y2004) 
Total Hardware Unit Sales (million) 49.45 
Hardware Adoption Rate 46% 
Total Software Unit Sales (million) 435.24 
SW/HW Unit Sales Ratio 8.80 



























Table 2.Monthly software game sales across categories 
 
No. Game Type 
Mean Value of 
Unit Sales (mln) 
Unit Sales 
Share(%) 
Mean Value of 
Game Titles 
1 sports 0.64 20.65 180 
2 action 0.63 20.28 117 
3 racing 0.52 16.50 113 
4 fighting 0.31 9.81 72 
5 shooter 0.22 7.06 83 
6 role playing 0.19 6.15 44 
7 adventure 0.15 4.94 37 
8 family 0.13 4.14 48 
9 arcade 0.10 3.26 22 
10 children 0.09 2.94 27 
11 flight 0.08 2.43 21 
12 strategy 0.06 1.84 27 















Table 3. Brand-level software availability 
 
No. Game Type Saturn PS N64 
1 sports 1 1 3 
2 action 1 1 1 
3 racing 1 1 1 
4 fighting 4 1 1 
5 shooter 4 1 6 
6 role play 1 6 22 
7 adventure 4 3 34 
8 family 6 3 4 
9 arcade 8 1 19 
10 children 1 13 34 
11 flight 9 1 1 
12 strategy 6 2 34 
 
Note: the numbers indicate in which month each type of game became first available 










Table 4A. Estimation results for essay 1 (no variety effect) 
 Model I Model II Model III 
Parameter Estimate s.e P Value Estimate s.e P Value Estimate s.e P Value 
0
hp  0.0027 0.0004 <.0001 -0.0001 0.0006 0.9238 0.0028 0.0005 <.0001 
0
hq  0.0405 0.0032 <.0001 0.0165 0.0052 0.0021 0.0392 0.0042 <.0001 
hM  49.3768 0.2636 <.0001 49.5767 0.2317 <.0001 49.3619 0.2769 <.0001 
h
p  -1.2388 2.1069 0.5578 -1.5153 1.9570 0.4404 -0.8678 2.1656 0.6894 
h
nov  2.3629 0.3584 <.0001 2.1007 0.2813 <.0001 2.1659 0.5084 <.0001 
h
dec  6.5473 0.6036 <.0001 6.0626 0.4892 <.0001 6.4187 0.6429 <.0001 
h
psg     0.0285 0.0061 <.0001   
 
h
qsg        1.0535 0.2891 0.0004 
# Obs 115   115   115   
2R adj 0.9205   0.9448   0.9189   
















Table 4B. Estimation results for essay 1 (with variety effect) 
 Model IV Model V Model VI 
Parameter Estimate s.e P Value Estimate s.e P Value Estimate s.e P Value 
0
hp  -0.0012 0.0008 0.1372 0.0025 0.0004 <.0001 -0.0003 0.0008 0.7518 
0
hq  0.0145 0.0110 0.1933 0.0345 0.0037 <.0001 0.0186 0.0111 0.0982 
hM  50.6353 0.4864 <.0001 49.9159 0.3182 <.0001 51.1146 0.6480 <.0001 
h
p  -1.5807 1.6996 0.3545 -1.7407 2.1231 0.4141 -1.7595 1.7099 0.3059 
h
nov  2.0955 0.2758 <.0001 1.8449 0.4084 <.0001 1.4604 0.2745 <.0001 
h
dec  6.0899 0.4816 <.0001 6.8199 0.6869 <.0001 6.3041 0.5392 <.0001 
1
h
ps  0.0506 0.0357 0.1587    -0.0202 0.0383 0.5985 
2
h
ps  0.0406 0.0071 <.0001    0.0440 0.0110 0.0001 
3
h
ps  -0.0798 0.0250 0.0019    -0.0212 0.0307 0.4905 
1
h
qs     1.0535 0.2891 0.0004 0.8426 0.2835 0.0037 
2
h
qs     0.0745 0.1556 0.6333 0.0963 0.1448 0.5075 
3
h

















Table 5. Estimation results for essay 2 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Parameter Value s.e. Parameter Value s.e. Parameter Value s.e. Parameter Value s.e. 
sg  0.017 0.102 sg  -0.032 0.112 1sg   0.642** 0.261 1, 1r sg    0.072 0.360 
      2sg   -0.991** 0.301 1, 2r sg    -0.095 0.375 
      3sg   0.166 0.112 1, 3r sg    -0.174 0.262 
PS  -3.131** 0.573 PS  -3.147** 0.570 PS  -2.392** 0.593 1,r PS   -3.759** 1.025 
64N  -3.391** 0.486 64N  -3.401** 0.484 64N  -2.495** 0.562 1, 64r N   -3.424** 0.666 
/100p  -1.377** 0.137 /100p  -1.315** 0.149 /100p  -1.428** 0.171 1, /100r p   -0.775** 0.246 
          2, 1r sg    1.789** 0.641 
          2, 2r sg    -0.161 0.964 
          2, 3r sg    0.877* 0.454 
          2,r PS   
-11.853* 3.008 
          2, 64r N   
-10.628* 2.868 
          2, /100r p   -0.970** 0.531 
         Size_seg1 0.553** 0.243 
   /1 7dne e  0.102 0.098 /1 7dne e  0.045 0.098 /1 7dne e  -0.314 0.218 
nov  1.048** 0.144 nov  1.071** 0.145 nov  1.003** 0.135 nov  0.701** 0.120 
dec  2.028** 0.136 dec  2.037** 0.136 dec  2.026** 0.128 dec  1.878** 0.107 
Ctr1 0.504 0.602 Ctr1 0.514 0.599 Ctr1 1.064 1.870 Ctr1 -1.403 2.124 
Ctr2 0.205 0.231 Ctr2 0.211 0.230 Ctr2 0.171 0.302 Ctr2 -0.027 0.310 
      Ctr3 -0.125 0.413 Ctr3 0.183 0.420 
            Ctr4 0.225** 0.134 Ctr4 0.065 0.157 
# obs   110 # obs   110 #obs   110 #obs   110 
Obj Fn  15.85 Obj Fn  15.70 Obj Fn  14.01 Obj Fn  8.85 
2R Adj.   0.83 2R Adj.   0.83 2R Adj.   0.84 2R Adj.   0.93 
** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%
114 
 
Table 6.Benchmark Model I for joint adoption: no adoption externality 
 
Adoption by Consumers Adoption by Developers in Group 1 Adoption by Developers in Group 2 Adoption by Developers in Group 3 
Parm  Value S.E. Pr>|t| Parm Value S.E. Pr>|t| Parm 
 
Value S.E. Pr>|t| Parm Value S.E. Pr>|t| 
h
op  
0.0016 0.0003 <.0001 
1sp  0.0038 0.0006 <.0001 
2sp  0.0098 0.0011 <.0001 
3sp  0.0031 0.0008 0.0003 
0
hq  
0.0411 0.0018 <.0001 
1sq  0.0444 0.0036 <.0001 
2sq  0.0302 0.0033 <.0001 
3sq  0.0377 0.0039 <.0001 
hM  
49.54 0.2639 <.0001 
1
0
sTN  917.15 6.2805 <.0001 
2
0
sTN  495.77 3.2942 <.0001 
3
0
sTN  363.85 5.0910 <.0001 
h
nov  
2.4412 0.2433 <.0001 
1s
nov  2.0288 0.2572 <.0001 
2s
nov  1.4994 0.2158 <.0001 
3s
nov  2.2753 0.3367 <.0001 
h
dec  
6.9403 0.3767 <.0001 
1s
dec  0.2587 0.1285 0.0467 
2s
dec  0.3376 0.1181 0.0052 
3s
dec  0.5947 0.2384 0.0142 
h
p  
-4.5815 2.0342 0.0265 
 
   
 
   
 
   
2R adj 0.9211 0.5023 0.5149 0.3901 
# Observations:                                              107 












Table 7. Benchmark Model II for essay 3: one-way adoption externality (in consumer adoption process) 
 
Adoption by Consumers Adoption by Developers in Group 1 Adoption by Developers in Group 2 Adoption by Developers in Group 3 
Parm Value S.E. Pr>|t| Parm Value S.E. Pr>|t| Parm Value S.E. Pr>|t| Parm Value S.E. Pr>|t| 
h
op  
0.0004 0.0005 0.5145 
1sp  0.0043 0.0008 <.0001 
2sp  0.0103 0.0012 <.0001 
3sp  0.0031 0.0007 <.0001 
0
hq  
0.0067 0.0114 0.5604 
1sq  0.0428 0.0043 <.0001 
2sq  0.0302 0.0038 <.0001 
3sq  0.0382 0.0035 <.0001 
hM  
52.59 1.0686 <.0001 
1
0
sTN  915.06 7.7926 <.0001 
2
0
sTN  492.84 3.9494 <.0001 
3
0
sTN  361.27 4.8426 <.0001 
h
nov  
0.8857 0.2034 <.0001 
1s
nov  1.8984 0.2465 <.0001 
2s
nov  1.4653 0.2021 <.0001 
3s
nov  2.2505 0.3388 <.0001 
h
dec  
5.3515 0.4162 <.0001 
1s
dec  0.2595 0.1716 0.1334 
2s
dec  0.3320 0.1245 0.0089 
3s
dec  0.6608 0.2546 0.0108 
h
p  
-0.2546 1.0693 0.8123 
 
   
 
   
 




-0.0836 0.0394 0.0362 
 
   
 
   
 




0.0324 0.0122 0.0091 




0.0628 0.0363 0.0869 




1.6484 0.3886 <.0001 




0.9987 0.3236 0.0027 




-0.6321 0.2767 0.0246 
 
  
         
2R adj 0.9434 0.5041 0.5174 0.3902 
# Observations:                                              107 
Objective Function Value:                      31.7543 
116 
 
Table 8. Complete model for essay 3: two-way adoption externalities  
 
Adoption by Consumers Adoption by Developers in Group 1 Adoption by Developers in Group 2 Adoption by Developers in Group 3 
Parm Value S.E. Pr>|t| Parm Value S.E. Pr>|t| Parm Value S.E. Pr>|t| Parm Value S.E. Pr>|t| 
h
op  
-0.0002 0.0003 0.3772 
1sp  0.0173 0.0057 0.0028 
2sp  0.0177 0.0039 <.0001 
3sp  0.0080 0.0052 0.1237 
0
hq  












0.0575 0.0090 <.0001 
hM  












756.07 418.70 0.0740 
h
nov  
1.5951 0.4314 0.0004 
1s
nov  2.5939 0.2950 <.0001 
2s
nov  1.8256 0.2424 <.0001 
3s
nov  2.6149 0.4290 0.0019 
h
dec  
6.1017 0.8342 <.0001 
1s
dec  0.7136 0.2307 0.0026 
2s
dec  0.5110 0.1500 0.0009 
3s
dec  0.8843 0.2769 <.0001 
h
p  
-1.2325 2.9262 0.6746 
 
   
 
   
 




-0.0233 0.0166 0.1658 
1s
h  
0.9400 0.0392 <.0001 
2s
h  
0.8540 0.0983 <.0001 
3s
h  




0.0322 0.0093 0.0008 




-0.0075 0.0110 0.4946 




0.9677 0.5651 0.0901 




0.7595 0.5550 0.1744 




-0.5706 0.3951 0.1520 
 
  
         
2R adj 0.9174 0.5162 0.5528 0.4073 
# Observations:                                              107 
Objective Function Value:                      29.6815 
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Table 9. Estimation result for co-diffusion model for essay 3 
(with active software market size in the hardware diffusion equation) 
 
Adoption by Consumers Adoption by Developers in Group 1 Adoption by Developers in Group 2 Adoption by Developers in Group 3 
Parm Value s.e. Pr>|t| Parm Value s.e. Pr>|t| Parm Value s.e. Pr>|t| Parm Value s.e. Pr>|t| 
h
op  
0.0007 0.0007 0.3201 
1sp  0.0206 0.0071 0.0047 
2sp  0.0185 0.0041 <.0001 
3sp  0.0098 0.0061 0.1114 
0
hq  
-0.0106 0.0051 0.0414 
1sq  








0.0576 0.0101 <.0001 
hM  












665.44 329.90 0.0465 
h
nov  
1.3219 0.3044 <.0001 
1s
nov  2.6576 0.3497 <.0001 
2s
nov  1.8891 0.2672 <.0001 
3s
nov  2.5588 0.4471 <.0001 
h
dec  
6.5731 0.8480 <.0001 
1s
dec  0.7769 0.2516 0.0026 
2s
dec  0.4176 0.1736 0.0179 
3s
dec  0.9038 0.3321 0.0076 
h
p  
-3.3186 3.3861 0.3296 
 
   
 
   
 




-0.0108 0.0086 0.2123 
1s
h  
0.9406 0.0339 <.0001 
2s
h  
0.8359 0.0991 <.0001 
3s
h  




0.0175 0.0145 0.2316 




-0.0035 0.0064 0.5829    




0.1325 0.1692 0.4357 




0.1976 0.1534 0.2009 




0.0644 0.1438 0.6554 
 
  
         
2R adj 0.9501 0.5104 0.5487 0.408 
# Observations:                                              107 
Objective Function Value:                      27.8692 
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Figure 1. A two-sided market framework 





























Side A:                
Software 
Developers 
 ( )A Bn F n  ( )B An F n
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Figure 4. Unit sales per title for the 5
th





















































































Figure 9. Policy experiment on hardware entry timing 







Figure 10. Policy experiment on hardware entry timing 
































































































































Figure 22. Elasticities of hardware unit sales 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
